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Abstract 
Like many of the Soviet satellite countries in 1989, the wake of the Velvet Revolution 
brought forth a Long awaited breath of freedom for the people of Czechoslovakia. A sense of 
euphoria imbued every moment leading up to November 24, .,the day Alexander Dubcek 
returned from political exile, and met with Vaclav Havel, leader ~ of the new opposition party, 
the Civic Forum, to address nearly 250,000 people in wenceslas square chanting Dubcek's 
name. Dubcek.. was elated to relate to the crowd that Socialism with a human face, which he 
created in 1968,. was once again alive and well. He then handed over the reigns to Havel as 
he urged support for the Civic Forum, claiming that the new opposition party truly 
represented the people of Czechoslovakia. 
However, something was soon to be lost in the excitement ~of the moment, something 
that had been a vitally important aspect of the movements that fueled the Prague Spring of 
1968. and the Velvet Revolution of 1989. Soon, everyone would forget about "Socialism 
with a human face". The Czechoslovak Socialist movement seemingly got what it wanted: 
an end to authoritarian Communism in Czechoslovakia. At the same time, there is really 
nothing Socialist about today's Czech Republic. A somewhat prevalent and logical theory is 
that today's Czech Republic is exactly what the Czechoslovak people had always wanted; 
that "Socialism with a human face" was in reality a facade for the Capitalist,. liberal 
democracy that had been sought after all along, but unattainable under the prevailing Soviet 
influences that had a strong hold of Czechoslovakia until 1989. 
Yet, in an analysis of the Czech Socialist movement that examines the political 
writings, speeches, and policies of Dubcek, Havel and Klaus, the three most, prominent 
Czech political figures of this time period, it becomes apparent that this simply cannot be the 
VI 
case. This thesis provides an analysis of the literature, something the literature currently 
seems to be devoid of, to demonstrate that there was an undeniable deviation from the 
Socialist ideologies that had been the prevailing, mainstream political ideologies of 
Czechoslovakia, beginning most abruptly and transparently in 1989 with.. the Fall of 
Communism. 
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So saying he dYew nigh, and to me held, 
Even to my mouth of that saYne fruit held past 
T~~iich he had plucked; the pleasant savory smell 
So quickened appetite that I, methought, 
Could not but taste. 
Paradise Lost: Book S : Lines 82-86 
Introduction 
On November 24, 1989, vaclav Havel and Alexander Dubcek stood side-by-side, 
overlooking Wenceslas Square before a crowd of several hundred thousand to address the 
nation. For days people had been gathering in Wenceslas square chanting Dubcek's name, 
waiting for their political hero in exile to-return. "My idea of socialism with a human face is 
living with a new generation", Dubcek told the crowd as he urged support for the new Civic 
Forum headed by Havel, which he now claimed "represented all the people (Smart)". 
Both Dubcek and Havel embodied the. Czech. struggle for freedom. In these two, 
Czechoslovakians could see themselves; they could relate to them because they had suffered 
as the people had. They represented the core beliefs of the deeply rooted Socialist ideologies 
of the people of Czechoslovakia. They w~eree one of them, because they said through their 
literary elegance or bravery and leadership what Czechoslovakians had. wanted to say for 
many years but couldn't 
However, something .would soon be lost in the excitement of the moment, something 
that had been a key feature of the movements that fueled the Prague Spring of 1968 and the 
Velvet Revolution of 1989. Soon, everyone would forget about Socialism with a human face 
and the words, written and spoken, that had seemingly brought them to Wenceslas square 
that day to celebrate their independence. .Since the formation of the new Czechoslovak state 
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in 1918, Democratic Socialism had dominated the ideological beliefs of the people of 
. Czechoslovakia and was at the heart of dissident and student political protests. It was a form 
of Socialism that was uniquely Czech, characterized by democracy at every level of 
society be that political, social or economic. 
At first glance, the Czechoslovak Socialist movement seemingly got what it wanted 
and end to authoritarian Communism in Czechoslovakia. At the same time, there is really 
nothing Socialist about today's. Czech Republic. Certainly such observations would provoke 
one to ponder whether or not we have been misinformed about the Czechoslovak Socialist 
movement; perhaps today's Czech Republic is exactly .what the Czechoslovak Socialist 
movement had envisioned but was unable to do in 1968; perhaps "Socialism with a human 
face", was in reality a facade for a much grander scheme of complete transition to a 
. Capitalist, liberal democracy. Logically, this argument is very persuasive: Dubcek and his 
colleagues knew well that only so many changes could be made as the Soviet .Union still had 
a great deal of power over them. In fact, the Soviet Union would demonstrate complete . 
power over the Czechoslovak state with the invasion of the Warsaw Pact countries later that 
spring. Furthermore, even if Dubcek would have called for unbridled Capitalism, . 
deregulation, and the privatization of all state owned industries, these things could likely 
have never been a possibility and. what they were searching for was rather a foot in the door, 
so to speak Socialism with a human face could be bold, but not too bold. The Velvet 
Revolution in contrast, had few if any restrictions on how far Czechs could deviate from 
Socialist policies and this allowed the Czechs to do what they had really been struggling for 
since the era of Dubcek and the Prague Spring. - . 
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. Yet, in an analysis of the Czech Socialist movement that examines. the political 
writings, speeches, and policies of Dubcek, Havel and Klaus, the three most prominent 
Czech political figures of this time period, it becomes apparent that this simply cannot be the 
case. . This thesis provides an analysis of the Literature, something the literature currently 
seems to be devoid of, to demonstrate that there was an undeniable deviation from the 
Socialist ideologies that had been the prevailing, mainstream political ideologies of 
Czechoslovakia, beginning most abruptly and transparently in 1989 with the Fall of 
Communism. 
It should be noted that the ideological shifts will be examined within the. confines of 
the Czechoslovak state., and to a lesser degree Communist Party influences ~in the context of 
Soviet Communism.. Obviously, if one were to examine why these changes took place, one 
would be obliged to go beyond these arenas; obviously ideological changes do not take place 
r 
in a vacuum. Indeed one would have to assume that other Socialist reform movements 
happening in Hungary in the mid-1950s and Yugoslavia for much of the period between 
1945 and 1989 had an influence on Czechoslovak politicians, and perhaps to a lesser extent 
the Czechoslovak public. furthermore, it is Likely that global Capitalist forces had a great 
deal to do with ideological shifts post 1989. However,, the question.of "why" is a subject in 
and of itself that could be dealt with as an entirely different project. This paper on the other 
hand, does not concern it self so much with "why"; rather its purpose, is that a shift in 
mainstream political ideologies did indeed occur and that Capitalist ideologies were not 
simply something that had lain dormant since 1948 because of an oppressive Communist 
regime. 
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Methodology 
The goal of this thesis is to determine whether mainstream Czech political ideologies 
remained consistent after the Velvet Revolution or if they had transformed from a - 
Democratic form of Socialism to those of a Capitalist liberal democracy. Although 
Socialism had alwayso enj Dyed popular support in Czechoslovakia, 1968 was a turning point 
in which Czechs and Slovaks began to assert themselves by means of dissention, protest and 
policy reform. It is at this point, at a time of social and political unrest, where one can more 
easily identify mainstream ideologies because people are voicing their opinions publicly. 
Therefore, although I felt it important to show that Czechs had always had a clearly 
identifiable affinity for Democratic Socialism prior to 1989, I believe the period between. 
1968 and _the present (as much of the wounds of Communism as well as the transformation 
are still present in various forms) provide the best evidence in which to analyze 
Czechoslovak Socialist ideologies. 
The criteria used to determine whether or not there was a transformation in ideologies 
was to find great political thinkers of this time period _whose overwhelming popular support 
would indicate attitudes about Socialism within the mainstream population. I also wanted to 
f nd thinkers who had an influence .on political policy and political change, thereby giving 
more evidence -with which to work. The main idea would be to find great political thinkers 
whose ideologies would be observable, and would have overwhelming popular support of the 
people of Czechoslovakia. 
The three best representatives reflecting these criteria during this time period are: 
Alexander Dubcek, who was the main catalyst for the Prague Spring and the subsequent 
movement to reform the Communist Party to a more democratic form of Socialism that had 
deep-seated roots in Czechoslovak mainstream ideologies; Vaclav Havel, political dissident, 
writer and philosopher, who not only spoke for the oppressed Czech and Slovak people after 
the Prague Spring, but. was an overwhelming unanimous selection to preside over the new 
Czechoslovak state after the Velvet Revolution; and finally, Vaclav Klaus, whose pivotal 
position as leader of the ODS, a popular_ political party formed shortly after the. Velvet 
Revolution, Prime Minster from 1992 to 1997, and most recently his election to~ the 
Presidency in 2003, has made him highly influential policy maker and spokesman for classic 
liberal political philosophy. 
In order to analyze observable evidence of each representative's ideologies I looked 
for written works, speeches or actually policies. I~ also wanted them to be widely circulated 
in order to clearly be understood as representative of the people. Furthermore, they Would 
need to relate to the mainstream Czechoslovak Socialist ideologies and their subsequent 
transformation after 1989. In the case of these three representatives, all had clearly met the 
criteria: Evidence of Dubcek's ideologies can be seen in his policy proposals, speeches and 
autobiography; Have1's can be seen in his dissident writings as well as a book he wrote in 
1991 explaining his thoughts about the state of Czechoslovakia since 1989; and Klaus's 
ideologies .can be seen through his many speeches and key policies that have directly affected 
the transformation process. 
The observable evidence of Dubcek's political ideologies can be seen in greatest 
detail in his Action P~og~am, which he presented to the Communist Party upon his 
appointment to First Secretariat.of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, explaining new 
policies and the more democratic role that the Communist P-arty should play in administering 
government functions in Czechoslovakia. ~ The Action PYog~am was influenced by a variety 
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of Socialist reformers, but clearly ..was clearly -headed by the leadership of Dubcek who 
. demanded that some of the most radical calls for reform were included in the document. I 
have used-two of Dubcek's transcribed speeches made during the Prague Spring which .were 
broadcast over Czech public radio and drew overwhelming~positive support from the 
citizenry. I have also, used Dubcek's autobiography, written in 1991 and 1992, which 
describes, in great detail, Dubcek's personal philosophy and his view- of the events of 1948, 
its successes and its fai-lures~. 
Havel and his writings were essential to this thesis because his influence spanned 
from the Tate 1960's to well into the late 90's, showing.the beginnings of ideological . 
- transformations. The three writing prior to 1989 were Cha~te~ 77, the infamous human rights 
declaration, An Open Letter to Gustav Husak (a letter to then president of Czechoslovakia 
and First Secretariat of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), and The .~°owe~ of the 
PoweYless, an essay which ultimately landed Havel in prison. Each make specific reference 
to, and an elaborate explanation of, the basic concepts valued by Czechoslovak Democratic 
Socialism. Furthermore; each of the three writings drew overwhelming support and enjoyed 
an enduring circulation. Charter 77; for example, first printed in 1977, was still gaining 
signatures well into the Late 1980s. . Still today, signatories of Charter 77 are held in high 
esteem in the Czech Republic. 
Havel's book, Summer Meditations, is most telling of the transformation of 
mainstream .ideologies. Written in the summer -of 1991, Havel candidly enlightens readers to 
the current political situations and .rebukes accusations that he was formerly- a Socialist. Key 
to the comparison of his earlier works is his clear endorsement of the Socialist reform 
measures introduced by Dubcek and his .later attempts to disassociate himself with Socialism. 
Adding to this transformation is Havel's new emphasis in the benefits of Capitalist markets. 
However, by the late ~ 1990's and early 2000's, it becomes clear that, despite his attempts to 
distance himself from Socialism and embrace the new Capitalist thinking, he is still too 
deeply seeded in ideas of cooperativism and the positive benefits of regulated markets to 
retain the support of the Czech people he once had. 
The most significant legislation introduced after 1989 was headed by Vaclav Klaus. 
Similar to Dubcek, Klaus introduced a body of Legislation entitled, the ~`tnategy fog .Economic 
Reform, which outlined the plan for privatization. The plan called for immediate measures to 
be taken to privatize, some of the measures coming long before sufficient legislation could be 
enacted, allowing for an economic environment opposed~to the former Democratic Socialist 
principles held by the people before 1989. 
Klaus also has. given a number of speeches which produce clear and straightforward 
insight into his political thinking. -The emerging acceptance of his plans and ideology laid 
out.in his speeches can quite clearly be shown in his popularity as a politician in general, but 
more particularly by his election to the presidency in 2003. 
The first section of this~paper will briefly summarize the roots of Czech Socialism 
that began roughly around the turn of the century. I believe this to be an important basis to 
begin with as it demonstrates the deep history of Czech Socialism and its appeal to the 
masses. This will also demonstrate that Czech Socialism was not merely ashort-lived 
movement of the moment that sprang up in the spring of 1968. The sections that follow will 
flow in chronological order, beginning with Dubcek, followed by two sections of Havel that 
examine the pre 1989 Havel and the post 1989 Havel. The main body will be concluded with 
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the examination of .Klaus and how. the policies and overall mainstream ideologies have 
.shifted, quite conclusively with the fall of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. 
It should be noted that ~in the case with Klaus, mainstream ideologies will have much 
more to do with Klaus's political influence than was the case with Havel and Dubcek, whose 
ideological agreements with the mainstream political ideologies of the people seems to be 
mutual: Much could be made of just who is pushing whom; however, .this is not my 
argument, nor does the~paper focus on why the .events took place. Rather, this paper will 
stick to its premise that mainstream ideologies can be examined through the writing and 
policies of Dubcek, Havel and Klaus and that through this examination, one can trace the 
transformation of mainstream Czech political ideologies. 
Chapter l: What is Czech Socialism? 
Socialist Beginnings: 1.897-1948 
Even before Czechoslovakia gained its independence in 1918, Socialism, in various 
forms, seemed to be the dominant political ideology of mainstream Czech and Slovak 
culture. The Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD or Ceska st~ana socialne deynok~aticka) 
which represented Czechoslovakia's first president, T.G. Masaryk from 1918 to~ 1935, is in 
fact is the oldest political party in the Czech Republic, founded in 1897. The second party to 
v 
represent the presidency was the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party (CSNS or Ceska 
st~ana na~odne socialni~, with Edvard Benes leading as president-de-facto from 1935 to 
193 8 and president-iri-exile from 193 8 to 1945. ~ Benes also served as Masaryk's foreign 
minister from 191.8 to ~ 1935. 
In the early years of the Czechoslovak state, there emerged five maj or parties (called 
Petka or The Five): the Republican Party of Farmers and Peasants, the CSSD, CSNS, the 
Czechoslovak Popular Party and the Czechoslovak National Democratic Pearty. All of these 
were characterized by Socialist leaning platforms save for the Czechoslovak National 
Democratic Party. The CSNS was a offspring of the CSSD, seceding before wWI. After the 
war, the CSSD was further weakened when the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC or 
Komunisticka st~ana Ceskoslovenska) seceded as well; however, until 1945, the KSC had 
very little power and did not carry any seats in Parliament. Both secessions were the cause of 
polarized ideological visions that developed into more moderate and radical ideologies.. This 
is ~ of course common, generalized information that can be found at a variety of sources; 
however, two sources have been an immense help in sorting the somewhat confusing 
1Q 
transformations of Czech political parties during this time: a book entitled History .of 
Czechoslovakia in Outline, by J:V. Polisensky, which details Czechoslovak. history to 1945 
and Wikipedia.org. 
According to~ Dubcek, not only were Czechoslovakians getting caught up in the 
ideologies of the Socialist movements, but left leaning parties all over the world were being 
broken up by the departure of the more radicals of the party to form various Communist 
parties (Dubcek 9). The split in Czechoslovakia was essentially a result of the Third 
International which the Czechoslovak Communist party members felt a necessary 
membership in order to gain a more competitive power politically. The KSC could not 
survive without the help of the Soviet Communists. As Kusin points out however, the 
Czechoslovak Communists were reluctant to give up "national and democratic traditions 
(Kusin 1)", ~in return for the "stiff conditions of membership stipulated by Lenin and Zinovev 
for those wishing to join the Communist International (Kusin 2)". In other words, the 
Czechoslovak Communists had not completely bought into the Bolshevik model at this toime 
but felt their platforms would not be realized without the strength in numbers the Communist 
International could provide them. This merger with the Soviet International would later 
prove to be a disastrous decision for Czechoslovakia; although the membership did increase 
(at. this time in 1921, Czechoslovakia claimed about 350,000 Communist party members, 
around 4% of the adult population, and grew to become the second largest party in the 
country by 1925) (Kusin 1), it essentially eliminated any chance for the time honored 
democratic principles of its members. . 
Klement Gottwald became the leader of the new Communist party with Stalin's 
personal blessing in 1929 and began his .push for full. Czechoslovak integration into the 
11~ 
Soviet Communist system. Edward Benes, member of the CSNS, became .president of 
Czechoslovakia in 193 5 following the death of T. G. Masaryk and continued Masaryk's 
"socialist leaning (Dubcek 8)" toward "industrial democracy", and "a more equitable system 
of landholding (Dubcek 9)". Following the German occupation in 193 8 however, Benes was 
forced to flee the country to London were he served as president in exile. Meanwhile, 
Gottwald took exile in Moscow and continued to orchestrate the ~KSC. 
Following the war, the two found themselves without enough party power or support 
to lead the country alone. The .reunion of the two parties resulted in the collaboration of a 
national strategic plan called the "Czechoslovak road to Socialism (Kusin 4)". Through a 
series of policy pressure tactics, threats within government offices, propaganda, etc., the 
Communists put themselves into a position to become the controlling government in 
parliament in 1948. . Soon after, the CSNS "was compulsorily merged with ,the Communist 
Party by totalitarian means(v~~►~vw.cssd.cz)"; although considering the means to .which the 
Communists put themselves in that position, it could be defined in terms nothing short of a 
take over; essentially a coup d'etat. Once again, as before World War II, "in order to avoid 
[political] repression some. of the social democratic politicians left _the country and formed a 
social democratic party in exile (vc~vvw.cssd.cz)". Here vie see evidence that the Socialist 
movement was not entirely without the autonomy to leave more leftist leaning ideologies in 
lieu of a complete Capitalist transformation that was seen after the Velvet Revolution. Social 
democratic politicians in exile would not have been Limited only to forms of Socialism by the 
pressures of the authoritarian Communist government. In fact, spending~exile in countries 
such as England or the U.S. (popular places of Czechoslovak emigres) one would tend to 
think that Capitalist views would be their largest influences. The fact that this party would 
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later re-emerge in the spring of 1968 with the support of "a large number of prominent 
.citizens, including Vaclav Havel (www.cssd.cz)" to fight for classic Czechoslovak Socialist 
ideals is~ evident that reformed Socialism was not simply a compromise, but a deeply held 
belief in a Socialist society that people were willing to suffer greatly for. 
13~ 
Early years of Czech Socialism and Dubcek's vision for reformation: 1948-1968 
The death of Stalin changed the political climate in Czechoslovakia.:considerably. ~Up 
to this point, since 1948 and the Soviet virtual coup d'etat, Gottwald and Novotny (serving 
consecutively both as first secretariat of the Communist Party and President of the Republic 
between 1948 and 1968), who had "based all their existence on absolute allegiance to the 
Soviet Union (Kusin 19), had followed Stalin's detestable authoritarian policies to a large 
degree. K:hrushchev introduced a considerably milder; less authoritarian form of 
Communism by this time Stalin's crimes were beginning to become widely known to much 
of the public and there was no other alternative than to denounce the past to save the faith of 
the public. As a result, "alternative political concepts] "~ began to emerge within the 
universities, which at the time were relatively free of direct control from the Central . 
Committee. Perhaps more importantly, these more liberal, less authoritarian, ideas began to 
flourish in the minds of a few politicians who, up to now, had felt no power to change strict, 
authoritarian, non-democratic policies (Kusin 20). 
At the Congress of 1956, Czechs and Slovaks began their push toward a °reformation 
of the un-democratic policies of the Czechoslovak Communist party. Czechoslovakia's 
leading intellectuals were given the opportunity to make speeches promoting reform, most of 
which were severely censored before given; however, the underlying themes are undeniably 
structured toward the Socialist and moderately Socialist ideals of the former CSSD and 
CSNS. It should be emphasized here that although the ideologies being pushed were coming 
mainly from the concepts that were identified with the former CSSD and CSNS, this was not 
an attempt to get rid of the KSC; Communism itself was not the problem, the authoritarian 
practices of the Communist government were. Thus, the goal was to implement more 
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democratic Socialist reforms to the KSC rather than to dismantle it. According to Kusin, 
..the reformers rather saw the Congress of 1956 as an~ opportunity to introduce a "socialist 
renaissance (Kusin 24)", based on democratic principles rather than the current totalitarian 
practices. The nature of these speeches (whose author's names weren't given ~to protect 
identities) were often condemning of the KSC policies and sought to emphasize the roots of 
Czech Socialism that had flourished before 1939. A major theme. wale the pursuit. of "a 
policy of democratization (i~.e. relax rigid centralization, removal of unnecessary limitations, 
etc.) (Kusin 22)". Furthermore, freedom of discussion, not only political, but.in the arts and 
sciences; was stressed to treat opinions opposing Communist party policies. as an acceptable 
form of discourse. 
A number of reasons can be given for the events that fueled the Prague Spring. 
Windsor and Roberts, in Czechoslovakz'a 1968: Reform, Repression and Resistance, narrow it 
down to three. The first was the failure of the economy, which had been considerably 
stagnant because of poorly planned consecutive five-year plans. Ian Jefferies, Professoro at 
the Centre of Russian and East European Studies at the University of wales, somewhat 
agrees that the social unrest may have stemmed from the poor economy; stating that although 
many consider the Stalinist crimes of the SOs to be the number, one factor persuading the 
Prague Spring, that perhaps more so, poor economic performance that began in 1962 with the 
abandonment of the Five Year Plan was a more influencing reason (Jeffries 246). Later it 
will be seen. that although both Havel and Dubcek had their problems with the economy, the 
authoritarian aspect of the Communist government, perhaps even more so for Havel, were 
certainly more critical problems. The second was the sour relations between the Czechs and 
the Slovaks. This was not so much a problem of individual relations, but more so Novotny's 
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repression of the "petty bourgeois nationalism of the Slovaks (Windsor 7)". The third factor 
according to Windsor and Roberts was the "considerable relaxation of intellectual control 
(Windsor 7)". 
Jefferies argues that at the Seventeenth Party Congress, the main criticisms brought 
forth were problems such as corruption,. inertia, inefficiency, and bureaucracy (Jeffries 246). 
It is likely that, at least in part, all of these were fuel for the fire of dissatisfied politicians, 
disgruntled workers and censored intellectuals. However, one can perhaps best apply the 
political platforms introduced by Alexander Dubcek's Action P~og~am, introduced in 
January 1968, as to what was most ailing the people of Czechoslovakia. 
On January 5, 1968, Alexander Dubcek was elected Secretariat of the Communist 
party, similar in stature to a Prime Minister. Dubcek.was hardly a Communist because he 
had .to be, nor were his Socialist reforms mere compromises between planned economies and 
pure markets. Dubcek was a fervent admirer of the classic ideals of 1Vlarxist philosophy, and 
had j oined the Communist party by the young. age of seventeen. ~As he recalls in his 
biography written between the years 1990 and 1992, he had high expectations of the new 
Socialist order, in the new and well planned economic growth, the evenly distributed 
production, in the "fair deal" ,that it promised. His ~ "belief in socialism was complete, and 
[he] was prepared to give it [his] heart and soul to bring about a better world (Dubcek 58)". 
Soon after his election in April, the Action P~og~am, a bold project headed by Dubcek with 
the help of a host of reformers, moderates, centrists, and conservatives (most notably the 
economist Ota Sik) which Dubcek had been pushing for since mid 1967, was adopted. 
Essentially, the Plan called for the "gradual return to the concept of democratic socialism, as 
it had prevailed in the European~Socialist movement at the turn of the century (Action 
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P~ogYam from Lunghi 147)". Certain gains had previously been made; the _plan made note of 
the Party's. success at bringing the means of production mainly into the hands of the workers 
and out of the hands of "capitalist exploitation". Czechoslovakians also enjoyed the sight to 
work (although "non-conformists" were seldom allowed j obs appropriate to their skills or 
interests) along with basic social security and medical care among a host of other things. 
However, the plan also admits that "deformations of the socialist principles which [were] 
known as the personality cult (Action .P~og~am from Lunghi 128)" had basically reversed 
Socialist rogress. The aims of the Programme were intended to be implemented by the 14thp 
Party Congress which would convene in 1970. Dubcek introduced the Programme to the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia with an address to its 
~memb ers 
. Comrades, 
... We are not changing our fundamental orientation; in the spirit of our 
traditions and former decisions we want to develop to the utmost in this 
country an advanced socialist society, rid of class antagonisms, economically, 
. technologically and culturally highly advanced, socially and nationally just, 
democratically organized, with a qualified management, by the wealth of its 
resources giving the possibility of dignified human life, comradely relations of 
mutual cooperation among people and free scope for the .development of the 
human personality.... (Lunghi 210) ~~ 
The Action P~og~am and Alexander Dubcek, became symbols of the entire reformist . 
movement and spoke for the vast majority of Czechs and Slovaks from all walks of life, be it 
factory workers, managers, students, professors or housewives. According to Lunghi, 
Dubcek's plan to reform Communism, then referred to as Socialism with a human face, was 
so overwhelmingly approved by the Czechoslovak people that even "after the Soviet invasion 
a larger number .of people joined the Czechoslovak Communist Party out of a genuine desire 
to support it than ever before....(Lunghio 14)". 
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. It should be noted however, that there is not a general consensus on how close the 
Action P~og~am was to Dubcek's personal ideologies. Lunghi believes that Dubcek more so 
symbolized the movement rather than lead it with his ideologies, as "many of .the reforms 
associated with his name were~not initiated by him but by his partners." Rather, Lunghi feels 
that Dubcek symbolized "the spirit. of those reforms (Lunghi 1 S)" rather than embodied them. 
However, Dubcek should not in any way be considered a mere puppet held up to represent 
the people; after all it was Dubcek who initiated and authored the document that the nation 
would embrace. In fact, as Dubcek would later recall in his autobiography, after reading a 
draft of the Central Committee's report on the Party's place in the political system, he 
demanded revisions and amendments, including: "a clear self-criticism of the Party 
leadership", a "report with a delineation between the power of the government and that of the. 
Party", and "the early preparation of an action program based on the decisions of the Central 
Committee". Thereafter, his demands provoked a "Pandora's box" for discussion and debate 
(Dubcek 115-116) that became the catalyst for The Action P~og~am. 
The Action PYog~am addresses almost every aspect of Czechoslovak life; politically, 
socially and spiritually, but can be broken down into three maj or issues: one, the 
development of Socialist Democracy and a new system of political management of society; 
two, the national economy and the standard of living; and three, the development of science, 
education and culture. All of these issues strongly emphasized a democratic Socialism 
particular to Czechoslovak ideologies uniquely born from their history as a.distinct nation 
and ethnic group, or what had. begun with the birth of the Czechoslovak state; in fact, 
whether the P~og~am is speaking of economics, politics or education, it emphases an 
indispensable democratic influence on each. 
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The first issue focused on the decentralization of the power apparatus and the 
. ~ democratization of the Communist party and society. ~ In fact, it could be stated that this was 
indeed the most important concept of the Action P~og~amme; without this first central issue, 
the other issues could hardly be implemented. To accomplish this, the party would-have to 
reverse .its bureaucratic, sectarian approach that had become prevalent since 1948. This 
system had become characteristic of an ever-increasing appreciation ®f "subservience, 
obedience and even kow-towing to higher ups (Action P~og~am from Lunghi 132)" that was 
a remnant of revolutionary dictatorship. These methods lead to a takeover of ~"state and 
economic bodies and social organizations (Action PYog~am from Lunghi 133)". 
The decentralization process would focus on making state bodies and agencies 
independent of each other, including directives, responsibilities and policies through a 
"system ~of mutual supervision" and an ending to "undue concentration of duties (Lunghi 
165)" (Note, this will be quite different than Klaus's reasoning for decentralization discussed 
later). Social organizations in particular, such as trade unions and the Czechoslovak Union 
of Youth, would control their own activities and purposes. Also, these organizations would 
be based on voluntary membership (not forced, which had been the case), entered into by its 
members because they expressed the members' interests. These organizations would be able. 
to choose their own officials and representatives. 
To democratize, the Action P~ogYamme would. debunk the myth that the Marxist-
Leninist concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat (Action P~ogYam from Lunghi 144)" 
was still needed. ~ The need for a dictatorship of the working class was over and the 
Communist Party would transform its role from a centralized source of authority to a 
promoter of Socialist initiative. It would be a part of the government body that would 
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coordinate the efforts of the people rather than dictate the wants of the people. It would be 
an instrument that would "strive for the voluntary support of the majority of the people", but 
would also be required to "alter Party resolutions and directives if they failed] to express 
correctly the needs and possibilities of the whole society (Action PYog~am from Lunghi 
145)". It would allow for an open .critique of ideas, both positive and negative,a in all 
°governmental agencies. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, persons in 
democratically elected government bodies would not only be persuaded to realize their own 
ability to influence other members as a give and take form of discourse, but also come to 
decisions collectively rather than simply following orders from decisions made autocratically 
from above (Action PYog~am from Lunghi 14d). Essentially, the Party would step away from 
being the government; and rather be a Socialist guidance system for the government and the 
people. 
To do this, the political bodies would be comprised of "highly qualified people, 
professionally competent and rationally organized (Action. P~ogYam from Lunghi 164)" 
rather than those most loyal to the Party apparatus. There would be safeguards for 
professional officials, but there would also be mechanisms to replace officials who could not 
function professionally and politically with the greatest competency (Action PYog~am from 
Lunghi 165)". Here it should be emphasized,° that the problems with remuneration were not 
that highly qualified positions were not being rewarded financially (as will later be the case 
with the Klaus argument), but rather that expertise and experience were not being rewarded 
with the proper position. 
Part of this democratization process was the reinstitution of basic political, social and 
human rights. It would not be enough for Socialism to simply liberate "the working people 
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from the domination of exploiting class relations (Action P~og~am from Lunghi 154)"; most 
.importantly, it would also constitutionally guarantee the freedom. of speech, freedom of the 
press acid assembly of special interest associations, societies and the right to oppose and 
criticize without fear, "by all legal means available (Action PYog~am from Lunghi 154)". 
The Programme would .especially emphasize the role of cooperatives, as well as social and 
olitical or anizations as laces for citizens to voice their opinions, wants and needs openly. p g p 
In particular, the Action P~og~am called for the distancing of the state/Party power apparatus 
from the individual agricultural cooperatives, calling to "abolish all. administrative, 
bureaucratic obstructions which impede the independent initiative of agricultural 
enterprises...to act independently and in a socialist way (Action P~og~am from Lunghi 137)". 
Furthermore, as a Socialist democracy, the new Czechoslovakia would "strive for the 
alleviation of exhausting labour, for the humanization of work and for improving the labour 
conditions of workers (Action P~og~am from Lunghi 137)". 
For a decentralization and democratization process to take place it would be 
necessary to reorganize the security apparatus, the STB, Czechoslovakia's equivalent to the 
U.S's CIA or the U.S.S.R's KGB. Dubcek and his followers felt that the security forces 
should be used to defend the country rather than protect the party. Furthermore, STB agents . 
(not. small in number) who had committed crimes "in violation of human rights (Lunghi 24)" 
"would be brought to account and given the fair trial they had denied others (Lunghi 22)". 
Indeed, the terror the secret police had been causing since the 1950s was. one of the major 
problems the Czechs and Slovaks had with their government. In fact, Dubcek himself would 
need these reforms to take place in shorter time than he had planned. Not long ~ after the 
Prague Spring was getting under way, Dubcek was imprisonment in ~1Vloscow during a visit to 
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the Kremlin while the Soviets attempted the implementation of a more cooperative President. 
Luckily Dubcek returned to Prague still the uncontested leader, of the country to make two 
final speeches before he was removed that would be broadcast in September and Qctober to 
reiterate, optimistically but in vain, "that there would be no return to the pre-January 
conditions (Lunghi 29)". 
Lastly, in order for the democratization of Socialism. to take place, it would- be 
necessary for political debate within government bodies to be transparent. Qnly in a forum, 
based on scientific analysis, without the fear of demotion or imprisonment of its participants, 
could the Communist Party expect the citizens to trust that the Communist Party truly 
represented their wants and needs (Action P~og~am from Lunghi 155). - 
Another maj or~ priority of the economic plan was to democratize and ensure the - 
"relative independence of enterprises and enterprising groupings [cooperatives] ...from state 
bodies (Dubcek 313)". Like Klaus will later. argue (albeit with a somewhat different 
interpretation which will be discussed in greater detail later), there needed to be an emphasis 
on the freedom of choice of the individual in the market place with the right to choose one's 
own consumption, style of life -and free choice of working activity (Dubcek 313). Conducive 
to this approach was the deconstruction of equalitarianism. As the plan argued, while in the 
process of .erasing class differences (a concept accepted by the plan, albeit in moderation) the ~-
Communist Party's "leveling" of society spread to such an unheard of degree that it actually 
became "one of the impediments to an intensive development of the -economy and [arise in] 
the standard of living (Dubcek 296)". Conversely the new program would remunerate 
workers based "upon the social importance and effectiveness of their work, upon the 
development of initiative, and upon the degree of responsibility and risk (Dubcek 296)". 
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Again, as will later be shown with. Havel, a higher income was not so much the problem as 
.not getting .work in a higher paying position relative~to one's expertise. . 
This should not be confused with the conditions of liberal Capitalist markets touted 
by Klaus. Doing a~vvay with equalitarianism did not give unlimited rights within the business 
sector to conquer through competition. The plan clearly called for extensive social welfare 
ro rams which were e ually concerned with "the interests of citizens in the lowest income p g q 
group, the interests of families with many children, citizens with reduced working ability, 
pensioners, and certain categories of women and youth (Dubcek 296)". The main difference 
between Capitalist markets introduced in 1990 and Dubcek's Action P~ogYam lay in the 
cooperative based Socialist intended approach to the market economy. Unlike a strict 
authoritarian system found in private enterprises of liberal market economies, the Action 
PYog~am called for the democratization of enterprising (large scale~enterprises) where 
workers would essentially become "managing mechanisms (Dubcek 313)" by allowing 
workers to ,influence the management of the enterprise through elected representation 
accountable to its constituents. 
The Action P~og~am claimed, "Prosperity can be achieved only on the basis of a 
modern and highly efficient economy which is able to assert its qualities in tough 
competition on the world market (Dubcek April 1, speech from Lunghi 105)". Thus. change 
to a market economy (a Socialist market economy). was seen as necessary, -but not at all costs, 
and only if the prosperity could "create[ ], for every individual person, conditions in which 
everyone [would] be able to assert. himself in all spheres of work and life (Dubcek April 1, 
speech from Lunghi 106)", again ensuring that there was a democratic process not only in 
personal and public life, but also for the life spent at work. Furthermore, the development of 
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"Economic effectiveness ... [could] in no case, be solved at the expense of the living. standard 
of the people (Dubcek April 1; speech from Lunghi 107)" (Klaus would later reinterpret this 
as the~majo~ity of the people). Democratic Socialism for the Czechs was not aone-
dimensional philosophy; it would imbue every aspect of their lives, from the economy to 
working conditions to a person's self worth and place in society. 
It should be reiterated that Dubcek was a firm believer iri the Communist Party, 
although a more flexible, democratic form that would allow the Czechs to create a system 
unique to their own individual tastes. His biggest problem with the Soviet model was the 
strict authoritarian practices, and he sought in his agenda "Communist persuasion" especially 
in the area of arts. and literature. In other words, writers, painters. or musicians would not go 
to prison for anti-Marxist-Leninist work, but would also perhaps be promoted more quickly if 
they did (Lunghi 19). 
Dubcek's role as a leader for the democratic movement was later emphasized in 
November of 196$ after the Central Committee Plenum essentially "nullified the Action 
P~og~am (Lunghi. 33)" of April that set the new agenda. In November, students from all over 
the country held athree-day sit in/strike, in support of Dubcek's defense of human rights. 
Their support was made official "in a ten-point resolution issued on.November 1$~h.. . 
[declaring] that freedoms of the press and of assembly were inalienable rights (Lunghi 33)". 
In general, it could be assumed that the public was most concerned about civil liberties or the 
violation of civil liberties. For the public it seemed their plight was focused on the negative 
things that affected them directly; namely STB interrogations upon suspicion of anti-
Communist discourse, the fear of imprisonment without a fair trial, coercion to join the party 
through employment and education incentives. 
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The events of this time, difficult as they may have been, seemed to solidify an 
. ~ideologicale unity within the people of Czechoslovakia clearly not. conducive ~to the political 
ideologies that have prevailed since 1989. . Lunghi concurs, explaining further that, although 
the freedoms lost as a result of the Soviet invasion of 68 were great, there were also 
compensations: most notably that the country, Czechs and Slovaks alike, "were closer in 
spirit than they.had ever been (Lunghi 30)". Dubcek, Leading a nation. wide movement, had 
brought to the forefront the ideals of Czech Socialism Czechoslovakians thought they were 
getting in 1948, hoped they would regain in 1968 and would soon forget about in the wake of 
the Velvet Revolution in 1989. 
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Havel the New Dissident Movement: 1968-1989 
After the heartbreak of the Soviet invasion and the loss of virtually all hope, the 
dissident movement that had been slowly recuperating, was finally revitalized in the mid-
seventies with three underground publications: Havel's Open Letter to Gustav .~Iusak 
published in 1975; the human rights declaration Cha~te~ 77, also written in part by Havel 
along with four other leading dissidents, Jan Patocka, Zdenek Mlyna~°, Jiri Haj ek, and Pavel 
Kohout, published in 1977; and Havel's The Power o, f'the Powerless, published in 1978. 
This time the dissident movement began its revival drawing on support of the international 
community; however, a slight shift in the emphasis from economics to basic human rights 
will also be seen. Havel will certainly still speak of the need for a Socialist free market based 
on cooperatives, and this certainly is not like the dramatic shift that happened in the wake of 
the Velvet Revolution, but it is likely that this is where the shift had its beginnings. 
Furthermore, the writings of Havel at this time will clearly show not only a distinct 
difference to mainstream ideologies post 1989, but to a lesser extent, his own writings post 
1989. 
Although Cha~teY 77 was published in Germany (as Czech censors would obviously 
not allow such a document to be published in Czechoslovakia at the time) the Charter was 
widely circulated through the underground dissident movement. The influence of Cha~te~ 77 
cannot be overestimated in its influence on the Velvet Revolution in 1989, for it was not a 
short lived document that fell to the way side after its initial popularity; by the mid 1980s it 
was still widely circulated underground and had gone from its original 243 signatories to 
over 1200 including an "open association of people of varied opinions, varied beliefs and 
professions (Cha~te~ 77 from Deutscher 13 0). ChaYte~ 77 was prompted by the International 
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Pact on Civil and Political Rights (referred to ~as the first -pact) and the International Pact on 
Economic,. Social and Cultural Rights (referred to as the second pact). Both .pacts were 
signed by the CS SR, and activated (at least in theory) in 1976 in Helsinki. Both Pacts of the 
Helsinki Agreement were based on the United Nations treaty, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, created vin 1966. However, like many treaties.., there was more symbolic 
meaning to the. Helsinki pacts then. there was an actually binding affect. Nevertheless, the 
Czechs signing the treaties gave dissidents a legal course of action against the CSSR in the 
World Tribunal Court. 
The Charter makes specific complaints against a number of articles in the pacts that 
had clearly been violated by the Communist government. Firstly, ChaYte~ 77, citing article 
'19 of the first pact, denounced the "tens of thousands of citizens [] prevented from working 
in their occupations merely because they [held] views differing from the official views 
(Cha~te~ 77 from Deutscher 127)" held by the Communist regime. It further went on to 
claim that these citizens were harassed by the authorities and public organizations as well as 
deprived of all means to defend themselves in a court of law. Freedom of fear, a preamble to 
the first pact, was also cited as hundreds of thousands of citizens feared losing their j obs 
based upon their political views. 
The right to an education was also cited. Article 13 of the second pact ensured the 
right to an education for all as "numerous young people are prevented from studying purely 
on account of their views, or the views of their parents (ChaYte~ 77 from Deutscher 127)". 
However, it should be noted that this prevention was not directed towards elementary and 
secondary schools which had not been a problem post-secondary education was its prime 
target. 
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. Point 2, article two of the first pact, claimed a right to "seek, receive and spread 
information and ideas of all kinds . ..orally, In Wrlting...ln print [and] through art (Cha~te~ 77 
from Deutscher 127)". This, the charter claimed, was not only being violated extra-
judicially, but also within the courts themselves, "often in the guise of criminal prosecutions 
(Cha~te~ 77 from Deutscher 127)". Furthermore, there was also no legal recourse for attacks 
of honor and reputation as guaranteed by article 17 of the first pact. 
Of course the actions of the Czechoslovak government were no different than before 
their signing of the pacts, but in signing the pact, the dissident movement had something that 
legally should have been internationally recognized and enforced. Journalist Matt Welch 
would agree, explaining that the angle Cha~teY 77 took was a legal tactic. In 1975 
Czechoslovakia became. a signatory of the Helsinki Agreement, which held covenants on 
civil political and economic rights. "Living up to Helsinki", Welch explains, "would have 
meant allowing free expression, freedom from fear, freedom of religious practice, and other 
rights then quashed by the Communists. 
Evidence of this legal tactic can be seen iri Havel's own personal defense speech at a 
trial in 1979 in which Havel was charged with subversive activity hostile to the state. 
"International pacts about human rights, which became part of the 
Czechoslovak legal code, dictate that not just state authorities, but, citizens 
have a duty to monitor how the rights guaranteed by these pacts are respected 
in their country. As a citizen of this country I personally took this duty onto 
myself...." (Naffziger). 
The constitution of the CSSR, its laws and legal norms were, on the.other hand, 
. "purely verbal, entirely unknown to citizens, and uncontrollable by them (Cha~te~ 77 from 
Deutscher 128)". The influence that. the Party had over legislative, executive and judiciary 
organs of the state, not to mention factories, institutes and public organizations, took such 
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"precedence over the law" that if a citizen felt their rights had been violated there was no 
. impartial institution to take their complaint to because there weren't any (Cha~te~ 77 from 
Deutscher 129)". 
The interference of privacy was also emphasized in the charter, citing article 17 of the 
first pact. These infringements included tapped telephones, bugged apartments, house 
searches, surveillance and a host of other things. Curiously however, the charter .goes no 
farther than what most would consider basic human rights. It does not once mention 
economic rights (other than denial or certain types of work because of political beliefs) or 
complain about the standard of living (which it certainly could have taken advantage of citing 
the first pact) that was discussed in great detail in the Action P~og~amme. As referred to 
earlier, one reason could be that, to a great extent, Czechoslovakians held a relatively 
wealthy position within the Eastern Bloc countries. For Czechs who had not traveled to 
wealthier Western economies, they most likely felt as if they were pretty well. off. Nor does 
it even emphasize democracy, only mentioning it once. . Most likely this is because the pacts 
from which they were citing had no requirements about democracy in general (i. e, there were 
components normally characteristic of democracies, but there was no requirement for a 
government to be Democratic as opposed to Communist). 
Two years prior to ChaYte~ 77 however, Havel personally sent an open letter. (actually 
a detailed essay) to then president Gustav Husak detailing what he felt were the most 
important issues of the day. Havel; ~ like Dubcek, felt that the original plan for Socialism had 
deteriorated. However, unlike Dubcek, Havel spoke in much deeper philosophical terms that 
had less to do with practical economic or educational needs and more to do with an overall 
human spiritual fulfillment. According to, Havel, the years prior to 1968 were somewhat of a 
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naive stage for Czechoslovakians; the support given to the Socialist movement, the "genuine 
and considerable attractiveness...of the social benefits it promised Open Letter from 
Deutscher 122)", were lost between the Marxist/Leninist plan for a revolutionary dictatorship 
needed for transition and ~a post 1968 government that was unable to see the former's 
mistakes. Havel's greatest fear in the period then was not so much the short term injustices 
(which were .still high ~on his list), nor even the need for a market economy, but rather the 
long term psychological effects of "the price we are all bound to pay for the drastic 
suppression of history, the cruel and needless banishment of life into the underground of 
society and the depths of the human soul, the new compulsory `deferment' of every 
opportunity for society to live in anything like a natural v~ay (Open Letter from Deutscher 
123)". 
For Havel, generally speaking, the people of Czechoslovakia were content; they 
"build houses, buy cars, have children, amuse themselves, live their lives (Open Letter from 
Deutscher 90)". However, for Havel, merely being "content" was not necessarily acceptable. 
On the contrary, people were not behaving ~ as if life were just fine because they wanted to, 
but more s~o because they had to. The answer is self evident to Havel: "they are driven to it 
by fear (Open Letter from Deutscher 91)". what Havel is more concerned with is the 
spiritual side of life. what has the country done he asks, "...for the enhancement of the truly 
human dimensions of life, for the elevation of man to a higher degree of dignity, for his truly 
free and authentic assertion in this world (Open Letter from Deutscher 91)". Ironically, this 
sounds strikingly. similar to the pro-capitalist rhetoric that will be espoused by Klaus in 
defense of the right to participate in a free market. However, although Havel may certainly 
agree with a free market, his free market tends to be more Socialist in nature; not an end all 
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to freedom but rather a single component in the enhancement ~of man's freedom to assert 
himself in the world. 
Havel's spiritual side of Life can be realized in many ways, but perhaps most easily 
through -the same. freedoms from fear enj oyed by the political elites and those well connected 
in the Communist party. In particular, but not limited to: "the enjoyment of undisturbed 
work [without fear of being fired], advancement and earning power, the ability to .work at all 
in one's own profession, the chance of higher education (open LetteY from Deutscher 94)". 
In .The Power of the Powerless, Havel recounts a story of a time he worked in a brewery. His 
. manager, who was a highly driven and skilled brewer, worked under a management team 
who "understood their work less and were less fond of it, but who were politically more 
influential (Havel 28)". After writing a Letter to~ the management team's superiors to voice 
.his concerns. about the inefficiency ~of the brewery, the higher ups claimed the letter to be a 
"defamatory document" and the manager was labeled .a "political saboteur." The manager 
was later "thrown out of the brewery and shifted to another one where he was .given a j obe 
requiring no skill (Havel 28)". Although efficiency for economic reasons .is important for 
Havel, more importantly Havel is concerned with the restrictions to use acquired skills and 
the ability to express oneself through the specialized labor of one's choice. It is more so the 
outside political restrictions to excel in what one desires rather than the lack of remuneration 
for excellence. As Havel concludes the story, "It begins as an attempt to do your work -well, 
and ends with being branded an enemy of society (Have129)". 
It may be. for Havel that the worst part of the problem lies in the fact that people were 
essentially forced into selling themselves out for better positions in all facets of life. It is the 
humility, the separation of oneself from one's true being (be that an artist, a conservative, a 
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liberal, a scientist, a school teacher, literally anything that is part of one's personality) that 
keeps people from not only succeeding to higher levels of living and social _standing, but to 
exist peacefully and contentedly. The result without this is that people "succumb to apathy, 
indifference towards impersonal values and their fellow men, to spiritual passivity and 
depression (Open -Letter from Deutscher 97)". For Havel, it is an inevitable consequence of 
man when under a constant and ubiquitous fear that infiltrates every aspect of life down to 
what one says not only in public, but also in private for- fear of being snitched on to the secret 
police, that "[d] espair leads to apathy, apathy to conformity, conformity to routine 
performance... (open Letter from Deutscher 98)". It is similar to the ~ example of the 
manager of the fruit and vegetable shop in The PoweY of the Powerless who places the 
"Workers of the world; unite!" slogan in his window. . As Havel explains, the manager does 
not do it because he really wants the workers of the world to unite. Quite the contrary, he has 
probably never thought much about the workers uniting, how it would be done or what would 
happen if it were done. Rather, the manager is saying to all who visit. his store and those that 
have allowed ,him such a position, that "I, the greengro-cer XY, live here and I know what I 
must do. Io, behave in the manner expected of me. I can be depended upon and am beyond - 
reproach. I am obedient and therefore I have the right to be left in peace (Havel 5)". 
For Havel, the private sphere of life is where most-find any remaining hope of 
enjoyment or fulfillment which results in an emphasis in the material aspects of their lives, as 
the home is the only place where one is allowed any kind of freedom of talents, artistic 
expression and industriousness, resulting in domestic comfort. This is not altogether a bad 
thing as it helps, if somewhat indirectly, to raise the standard of living which the "inflexible, 
bureaucratized and unproductive state sector of the economy (Open LetteY from Deutscher 
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99)" is unable to do. Indeed, this is not something Havel takes lightly; as a rise in the 
..standard of living ~is something he will focus on a number of times. However, aside from the 
economic benefits, it is simply "an escape _from the sphere of public activity... a desperate 
substitute for living (Open Letter from Deutscher 99)". 
Furthermore, because man has. in a sense been forced to spend all creative energy on 
private, material improvement, he has become 'a "...simple vessel for~the ideals of a primitive 
consumer society... ". This energy has turned materialism into a fetish, rather than a past of 
man's need to raise his standard of living. Conversely, Havel believes "man should live in 
full enjoyment of social and legal justice, have a creative share in economic and political 
power, be raised on high in his human dignity and become truly himself (Open Letter from 
Deutscher 101)". Key here to one of the focuses of this essay is how Havel equates the kind 
of power that man should have in economics and politics "a creative share". Havel 
addresses this specifYcally in The Power of the PoweYless, while explaining in his summation 
of the essay, "What then is to be done?" 
Both political and economic life ought to be founded on the varied and 
versatile cooperation ~ of such dynamically appearing and disappearing 
organizations. As far as~ the economic life of society goes, I believe in the 
principle of self-management, which is probably the only way of achieving 
what all the theorists of socialism have dreamed about, that is, the genuine 
(i.e.,~ informal) participation of workers in economic decision making, leading 
to a feeling of genuine~responsibility for their collective work. The principles 
of control and discipline ought to be abandoned in favor of self-control and 
self-discipline (Havel 48, 49). 
Here it can be seen that Havel's ideas about economics is conducive, nearly identical, 
with those outlined in the Action Programme. Creative decisions ~ concerning politics and 
economics will be shared by the people of the state. Both politics and economics will be 
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democratically controlled, all citizens will have a say in how it represents them. Concerning 
economics, it is likely, .with Havel's hatred of the centrally planned economy as well as the 
fetishism of material goods, or the "life reduced to a hunt for goods (Open Letter from 
Deutscher 101)'', he is speaking of something along the lines of Dubcek's plan for 
cooperatives and democratically elected representatives in places of work. In other words, 
Havel clearly sees the difference between a rise in the standard of living and an obsession 
with material goods. More so, when Havel speaks of a standard of living, he is not speaking 
of the great void of Capitalist markets as Klaus later will; he includes quality of living as a 
necessary component as the hunt for material goods is apt to leave a nation without a culture, 
a spirit or a voice. 
Again, for Havel the existing problems in the mid to late 1970's were not so much 
.problems of the centrally planned economy although this certainly was on the list the 
maim focus for Havel and his dissident colleagues was the absence of the basic civil liberties 
required to have freedom of expression; not only to say what one wanted to say, but to Live 
without the fear of saying and doing what one felt like doing. It was the lack of freedom to 
express oneself that imposed the absence of magazines and periodicals of all sorts, as well as 
novels that not only were excluded from publishing houses for anti-government messages, 
but anything that included a "spark of a slightly original thought, perceptive insight, deeper 
sincerity, unusual idea or suggestive form"; in short, ~ anything "cultural (Open Letter from 
Deutscher 108)". It was the ~"destruction of confidence in the meaning of any such values as 
truth, adherence to principles, sincerity, altruism, dignity and honour (Open Letter from 
Deutscher 102/3)". It is certain that Havel (as he will later write), and most other dissidents 
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wanted to work with a market economy, but one that was controlled democratically under 
.cooperative methods and systems. In fact, it is not so~ much the apparent loss of a raised 
standard of .living that Havel has a problem with in a centrally planned economy, but rather 
that a government that controls every aspect of the economy, including employment, is not 
qualified to make employment decisions. It is not so much the loss of income or GDP, but 
rather the deep sense of humiliation one feels when they "take orders everyday in. silence 
from an incompetent superior....perform[ingJ ritual acts which he privately finds ridiculous 
(Open Letter from Deutscher 120)". Certainly for Havel, one does not find personal content 
with simply a raised standard of living, nor does it seem so for Dubcek or the general 
movements that ushered in the Prague Spring and the velvet revolution. 
As Dubcek explained the need to rid the country of equalitarianism, .Havel called for 
an end to entropy. As was mentioned earlier, Dubcek's focus was on the equalitization of the 
work force and the Lack of incentive therein. Dubcek, as a politician understandably, focused 
on the need for specialization, expertise in industry and the sciences and justice for those that 
are qualified for those positions. Havel speaks of the same things but on a deeper 
philosophical level; rather than focusing on productivity and fulfillment with one's 
profession, Havel takes his argument against equalitarianism to the .level of absolute entropy 
that infiltrates all facets of life working, social, spiritual and intellectual. For Havel, it is 
the perpetual, forcibly imposed uniformity that develops "a fundamental distrust of all 
variety, uniqueness and transcendence; a fundamental aversion to everything unknown, 
impalpable and currently obscure; in basic proclivity for the uniform, the identical and the 
inert; in deep affection for the status quo...(Open .Letter from Deutscher 113)" ultimately 
35 
resulting in a dichotomous state of being in which the complexity and,probability.that is Life 
no longer exists. 
~6 
.Chapter 2: Post Transformation: The New Democratic State 
Havel and the redefinition of Socialism - 
The beginning of the real transformations in Socialist ideologies can be seen with the 
fall of the Communist government in 1989. As will be seen however, although Havel claims 
to hold the same beliefs as he always had, there certainly seems to be, if not a change, 
certainly a new emphasis ~ in the benefits of the free market. Although this paper has allowed 
the inclusion of Socialist markets into market economies, it is clear. when Havel speaks of 
market economies post 1989, he is no longer speaking of the Socialist markets he referred to 
specifically in The Power of the Powerless in 1978. At the same time however, he is 
certainly nowhere near the supporter in the absolute pure markets Klaus will begin to push - 
for. Havel becomes somewhat Tike the intermediary, fusing the old Socialist beliefs with the 
newer beliefs in pure, capitalist markets. - 
In summer Meditations, a book Havel wrote in the winter of 1991 and 1992 (shortly 
after the break up of Czechoslovakia into the Czech and Slovak Republics) Havel reflects 
upon the transition and speaks in much the same philosophical tone as he did ~in the open 
letter to Gustav Husak in 1975. Here however, Havel is addressing the nation (his audience) 
in the first person, not only describing his social and political principles but giving some 
explanation to his proposals, the general state of affairs, and the great changes that had taken 
place since the Velvet Revolution. ,Havel claims the book is not a collection of essays (which 
it distinctly resembles), nor is it a work of political science; rather "it is merely a series of 
spontaneously written comments on how I see this country and its problems- today, how I see 
its future, and what I wish to put my efforts behind (Introduction to Summer Meditations". 
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. Although much had changed in Czechoslovakia under Havel's presidency. since 1989, 
Havel claims to not have changed his principles in the slightest. As he writes in the forward 
of summer Meditations concerning his fundamental beliefs: "in my concept of politics, in 
how I see its inner spirit ~ absolutely nothing has changed". However, there does seem to be 
a shift in how he views Socialism; in particular, how he defines Socialism. As questions 
arose in the months during and after the revolution about Havel's affiliation with the Socialist 
party, "Are you a Socialist?", Havel needed to clear up some statements he had made in the 
past. Apparently, Havel, formerly in his dissident days had claimed to be a Socialist. 
Indeed, before 1989, this statement would have gone quite unnoticed ~ in fact in did! 
However, after 1989, the word "Socialist" took on a new meaning .and seemed to be more 
aligned with Communism, and not the reformed Communism of Dubcek and the Action 
PYog~am, but rather the highly authoritarian Soviet Communism that had persisted since 
1968. It is not the purpose of this paper to question Havel's sincerity in making the statement 
in the first place or mending the statement later; however, since claiming to be a Socialist 
before and after the Velvet Revolution would have been received differently, it is worthy of a 
brief discussion. In Summer Meditations Havel claimed that when h~ formerly referred to 
himself as a Socialist, it was meant to be taken more as describing "temperament". Havel 
claims he was not "identifying [himself] with any specific economic theory or notion...I 
merely wanted to suggest that my heart was, as they say, slightly left of center... a 
nonconformist state of the spirit, an anti-establishment orientation, an aversion to philistines, 
and an interest in the wretched and humiliated (Havel 61)". 
Havel describes his own social and economic philosophies and how they have 
meshed with the pre-1989 revolutionary spirit and post-1989 transition period. As with any 
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revolution however, where dichotomist ideologies clash with severe consequences; and 
.political and non political actors ~ alike are attempting to distance themselves° from the 
"wrongs" of the past, it is often difficult to take completely at face value anyone's political 
beliefs. ~ Havel would agree, at least in certain forms, that this idea (which is as old as regime 
change) is indeed often. the case and during the early post-1989 years even the word "social" 
"create[d] the suspicion", among orthodox supporters of the market economy (which, would 
include Klaus, then Minister of Finance), that socialism, so diligently driven out, is 
surreptitiously creeping in through the back door". But the fear of Socialism for Havel is not 
necessarily the fear of losing Capitalism as it is the fear that the state "bringing with it the 
smug conviction that City can, and ought to, organize production for industry, lives for people, 
and a future. for society". For Havel, it is rather the fear of "dogmatism or fanaticism" that 
can also be found in the believers of the "systemic purity" of market economics (Havel 71). 
Still, Havel does seem to do much back-peddling and ideological defending in the 
chapter entitled "What I Believe" and takes considerable time to explain why he "once" . 
considered himself a Socialist. One would tend to believe that "Socialist", or So~ciaiism, 
although obviously as multifaceted as any political ideology underneaththe label, would tend 
to concern itself mostly with economics; dealing with cooperative businesses, redistribution, . 
massive social .security nets, etc. Havel however, explains that claiming he was a Socialist 
was not necessarily referring to any centrally planned economic ideology. ~ He goes so far as 
to say that a market economy "... is the only naturally economy, the only kind that makes 
sense, the only one that can lead to prosperity, because it is the only one that reflects the 
nature of life itself (Havel 62)". Furthermore, that it "is as natural and matter of fact to me as 
the air...it is a system of human economic activity that has been tried and found to work over 
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centuries (centuries? millennia!). It is the system that best corresponds to human nature . 
(Havel 65)". And yet, it seems there was nothing in Cha~teY 77 denouncing the human rights 
violations caused by neglected economic sovereignty. In fact, in nowhere is it ever 
mentioned that college students protested Socialism or planned economies yet this seemed 
to become the one area that consumed most politicians' minds in 1989. 
Indeed, the political rhetoric swiftly shifts to free markets post. January 1989; 
something that Havel spent little time on, and Dubcek speaks of only in connection with 
cooperatives and representative management before the Velvet Revolution. In fact, Havel 
only mentions economics twice in his Open Letter to Gustav Husak. In the opening, Havel 
comments on the current living standards. "The efforts of our citizens", ~he claims, "are 
yielding visible results in a slowly rising standard of living: people build houses, buy. cars, 
have children, amuse themselves, live their lives (Open Letter from Deutscher 90)". Further 
on, he devotes a section to "Private and Public Sectors". It is Havel's .assertions that Czechs 
are spending more time at home in an attempt to raise their home living standards, or have 
"turn[ed] their main attention to the material aspects of their private lives (Open Letter from 
Deutscher 99)". Why they do this, and why this is encouraged by the government has several 
benefits. Firstly, for the citizens, it has unquestionably improved their standard of living. As 
Havel points out, Czechs, through their own personal efforts, have made more use out of 
their gardens at home, as well as, built small cottages at remote gardens set aside by the 
government for people's use in which they can better enjoy the weekends and evenings. 
They have taken better care of their cars and become much better seamstresses with which to 
make and repair clothing; in short, they have become experts in frugality. For the 
. government, the benefits are doubled; they get to enjoy the economic fruits of extra energy 
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that has boosted the economy even if only mildly; and with this "'inward' orientation as the 
. very essence of human fulfillment on earth (Open Letter from Deutscher 99)", citizens have 
also retreated from the sphere of public activity. Yet there is no direct criticism of the . 
economy, and the. only problem with the standard of living is that it has risen for the wrong 
reason; a fetish of material goods. 
Perhaps it was not so much that Havel was calling for a market economy for more 
material goods and greater integration into the global market, but rather lamenting the fact 
that man could not expend his attention on politics, Splrltuallty, philosophy, the arts or any 
type of local. civic involvement with freedom of thought and speech, in a "primitive . 
consumer society.. ,subject to the limitations of a centrally directed Market (Open letter from
Deutscher 100)". Havel's view on this is quite complicated, but seems to mean that the 
problem does not lay so much in man's pursuit of material things, perhaps even to an 
obsession or fetish, but rather that man has no other choice in the matter. Presumably then, it 
seems as though this is where the market economy comes in. Whatever the case maybe, 
Havel doesn't necessarily make a~call for a market economy based on the. injustices of 
economic equalities inherent in Socialism, nor a higher GDP, but rather~~ calls for society that 
allows fora "creative share in", among other things such as legal and social justice, 
"economic decision making (Open Letter from Deutscher 100)". Havel's fears are that the 
entire Czech population, excluding government officials to a lesser degree, is "becoming 
obedient members of a consumer herd (Open Letter from Deutscher 101)". He has called for 
participation in "economic decision making", with the input of local officials, locally and 
freely elected, and local shopkeepers as well as consumers. It is not merely enough that one 
is able to "freely choose which washing machine or refrigerator [ones wants to buy (Open 
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Letter from Deutscher 100)", but also the possibility to decide how many are made and how 
many will work to that end, how much they will be paid for making it and how much will it 
cost to buy it. However, Havel is somewhat vague here which makes it difficult to pinpoint 
his exact meaning. what we do know is that he was not in favor of a centrally planned 
economy, but more importantly, in favor of a society that is allowed to loosen the shackles of 
the fetish of .materialism by greater democratic participation in all spheres of life especially 
the arts and personal expression. 
Still, it seems economics (it terms of how much money one has) meant little to Havel 
as a dissident. In his Open Letter to Gustav Husak, rather than focusing on market 
economies and how they have naturally materialized from natural human needs, he feels 
compelled to focus his complaints on the regime's responsibility for "deadening life for the . 
sake of increasing uniformity; of deepening the spiritual and moral crisis of [] society, and 
ceaselessly degrading human dignity, for the, puny sake of protecting [Husak's] own power 
(Open LetteYs from Deutscher 125)". In fact, one would have to wonder why, when Havel 
virtually never mentions markets directly in his protests, he comes out of the closet, so to 
speak, as a passionate proponent of free markets after 1989. In Summer Meditations (71-73) 
Havel speaks of his belief that major industries should be highly regulated, at least to begin 
With, but certainly never mentions cooperatives and democratic control within firms by their 
employees as he had in The Power of the Powerless. What was never considered or 
mentioned through all the years of protesting and imprisonment suddenly became the 
primary focus of the new government for the welfare of the citizens. In fact, to study 
Havel's political activism pre-1989, one would have thought that the economy was never a 
problem for Havel at a11! Post 1989 however, after over twenty years. of political activism 
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during which Havel says relatively little concerning the need "for a market economy, it now " 
becomes not only a focus, but an absolute necessity "for the welfare of the people because "it is 
as natural to the human spirit as breathing. One could perhaps speculate along the lines of 
the alternative theory proposed in the introduction; that it would have simply been too risky 
in 1975 to mention such things. However, having spent more than four years in prison in the 
late 70s and early 80s for asking citizens in his essay The Power of the Powerless, "to behave 
as though they were free and resist the lies of the state (Secor)", one could hardly assume that 
Capitalism would have been too taboo a topic for Havel. 
Perhaps it is how Dr. Paul Bock, Professor Emeritus of religion at Doane College, 
" reveals through correspondence, the perspective of a signer of Charter 77 on the transition. 
"Dr. Bock's concern was with the former plans, headed by Dubcek in 68, to blend Socialism 
with Democracy. Now, his fear was that the leaders representing the new government were 
forgetting about Socialism altogether and only spoke of free enterprise. Jack Troj an, a long 
time friend of Dr. Bock's and a signer of Charter 77 replied, 
"The events of the so-called real socialism have been so~ horrifying that 
particularly. the young generation has lost any enthusiasm to follow the socialist 
path.... Whether this inevitably involves the danger of losing some of the " 
benefits of socialism is very difficult to say now. It is up to us, ,the old 'socialist 
fossils,' to prevent this". (Bock) " 
In other words, it is likely that" after the Communist government was toppled, its many years 
of publicizing Socialist agendas turned the public completely disagreeable to anything 
"Socialist". 
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Klaus and the Spirit ~ of Capitalism 
One maybe able to take Havel at his ~ word when he claimed in his concept of politics, 
absolutely nothing had changed. But perhaps his new emphasis in the benefits of Capitalist 
markets (there was certainly no mention of Socialist market economics in Summer 
Meditations) was pressed on him by the public, or perhaps more so by his political 
colleagues, who had got caught up in what Gil Eya1 refers to as the "Spirit of Capitalism". In 
his article, Anti-Politics and the Spirit of Capitalism, Eyal claims that the transformations in 
the various former Soviet satellite countries were all "imbued with the `spirit of capitalism' 
(Eyal 1)", perhaps for the same reason as Havel gave for the feeling of euphoria felt shortly 
.after Communism was. instituted in Czechoslovakia in 1948; naive optimism of what was to 
come, combined with the relief felt from leaving a deplorable situati®n behind (Open Letter 
from Deutscher 123)". 
Lawrence King, in his book The Basic Features of Postcommunist Capitalism in 
Eastern Europe, would add that "...during the rightful of euphoria over the collapse of the 
oppressive Communist Regimes, some forgot that capitalism is not now, nor ever was, a 
particularly "fair" or just .system (King 16)". But neither had been the planned economy 
either, and the important thing was that it was over and something new was coming, 
something that promised a better life, better paying jobs, bigger houses and nicer cars. Klaus 
agrees that the euphoria was a catalyst to having his plans realized. In a paper delivered at a 
conference sponsored by the Center for Economics and Politics in Prague in 2006, Klaus 
recalled that, 
"We knew that there was nothing to wait for, because the euphoria 
that followed that collapse of Communism would not provide us with an 
unlimited time and room for unpopular and painful steps. We knew that it 
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was necessary to take the advantage of the temporary Weakening. of all the . 
various interest groups, which...would under normal circumstances obstruct 
change and promote their own special interests (Klaus 2)". 
Here, it seems Klaus alludes to the unpopularity of unregulated Capitalist markets 
that existed at the time, insinuating that Socialist markets were still the desired 
economic model in the winter of 1989. Interestingly, still today Klaus claims that 
those who seek the further implementation of deregulated and pure markets are forced 
to constantly battle the Communist reformers and Socialist utopians. Although, as 
will later be demonstrated, Klaus seems to be exaggerating the point, to put it .mildly, 
as the Czech Republic today is likely. the least Socialist, economically speaking, than . 
it has ever been since1989. 
Forwarding this spirit of Capitalism, economists such as Klaus who were fervent 
.students of Milton, Adam Smith and other admirers of a deregulated pure market economy, 
came out of the closet so to speak, and asserted plans which would have not only been 
impossible for political reasons pre-1989, but would also have been unacceptable by the . 
Socialist reformers and dissidents. Furthermore, the corruption that lead to those in 
economically and politically strategic positions to become millionaires literally overnight in 
the early years of the new state, made Capitalism an enticing enterprise for anyone with 
intentions of opening a business. 
Indeed, it should be noted that the "Spirit of Capitalism" may have been more of a 
spirit .that took a hold of those whom could stand to gain greatly from it. Much of the public 
however, needed. to be sold on the idea as many still held onto the former Socialist ideologies 
so long sought after. As King points out, it seems as though firms tried to sell the new spirit 
by going back to the Socialist roots that were traditionally near and dear to the people's 
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hearts; cooperatives or employee-owned companies that promised to give both freedom and 
great financial rewards, similar to what Dubcek tried to legislate in the Action P~ogYam and 
Have1~ spoke of in The. Power of the PoweYless. However, the Loopholes in government 
policies in favor of upper management were extensive and numerous. Firstly, most often 
opportunity. to subscribe to shares was based on salary and seniority. One result here was 
that ownership was diffused greatly among employees and concentrated among management 
whom already shared a monopolization of information the employees.. did not. Furthermore, 
as the dividends to employees were nearly insignificant, eventually, shares would be sold to 
majority holders for substantial profits .that stood to be even more profitable for larger 
shareholders. For employees, focus generally remained on simply keeping j obs in a highly 
volatile market that saw periods of high unemployment. Secondly, it was common that the 
workers could only appoint one-third of the seats on the Supervisory hoards and thus had 
very little real power in decision-making (King 81-82). Thus, what seemed like a democratic 
process clearly was not. 
Although many factors helped change the economy and the ideologies to ~a spirit of 
Capitalism, Vaclav Klaus has surely been the leading figure in the process. In 1989, Klaus 
joined the Civic Forum (OF or the Obcanske Forum) and .soon was appointed the Federal 
Minister of Finance. Klaus, then ~as well as now, was a firm believer in classical liberalism 
and Its basic concepts of the primacy of the individual, freedom without "unnecessary and 
often contradictory innovations" such as positive rights, and free markets with their "formal 
equality of opportunity (E`~eedom and its Enemies, Klaus)". This transition however, would 
not change overnight. Czechs .had been bound within the confines of regulated markets for 
the better part of forty years and change would not come easy. Klaus knew as well that it 
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would not be easy. "The fall of Communism'', he claimed in ~a speech given for the Mont 
Pelerin Society, "does not automatically lead to a system we [classic liberals] would like to 
have and Live in (The Intellectuals, Klaus 3)". For Klaus, pure Capitalist markets would need 
to be fought for. . 
In 1989, as the fall became inevitable, Czech politicians divided into a number of 
conflicting theories of how the transition to a free market economy should be handled. 
Martin Myant, author of The Rise and Fall of Czech Capitalism, chooses to focus on two, 
although he admits that these two, "[do] not adequately encompass and explain the 
differences in economic thinking in Czechoslovakia" at the time. The only consensus, he 
claims, was that. the ultimate aim would be a modern market economy. 
The two economic formulas Myant focuses on are shock therapy and gradualism, and 
it is here that the battle (ultimately~to be won by the non-Socialists) between the ideologies of 
the old and those of the new begins to clash for the firs time. This point in time is the 
beginning of the .abrupt shift in ideologies mentioned in the introduction, highlighting the 
evidence that the economic conditions in particular became far from what the Socialist 
movements leading up to the Velvet Revolution had envisioned. Klaus, Minister of 
Finance at the time, was the eventual spokesman for shock therapy. The strategy, officially 
entitled The Strategy foY .economic RefoYm, insisted on: the inclusion of the IMF package; a 
focus on anti-inflation and monetary restraint; denationalization and privatization,, largely 
done through restitution, public auction and the voucher system; price liberalization, 
including some key industry price .controls along with generally strict wage ~controls;~ the 
move to internal currency convertibility, relieving state controlled exchange rates; and finally 
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social aspects, which were vaguely planned and generally considered unimportant by the 
Klaus administration (Myant 20). 
: Klaus was often characterized as narrow minded, dogmatic and arrogant just the 
dynamic character that was needed to implement such a program that had many opponents. 
Klaus himself believed that the classical Liberals were relatively a small group compared to 
what he calls the Communist reformers and the newer Socialist utopians. Being the Minister 
of Finance however, Klaus was in a position to take certain measures that would eventually 
make the Strategy fog Economic RefoYm all but inevitable. Firstly, Klaus announced the 
Czech's withdrawal from the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), which, 
most importantly, ended favorable trading Links in basic materials from the Soviets. 
Secondly, he revised the federal budget which contained major. cuts .in spending. Klaus also 
employed countless advisors to work on ideas ~ of mass privatization and the voucher method. 
The gradualist approach was headed~by Va1tr Komarek, then Deputy Prime Minister 
of the Civic Forum, a position soon to be ~ lled by~ Klaus. Komarek categorically rejected an 
economic shock on grounds that social costs would be too high. Like Havel, who wanted the 
state to play an ever-diminishing role in guiding the economy (Havel 73), Komarek favored 
structural change from the center that would be slower, lasting several years. ~ Komarek's 
plans however, were quite vague and he was eventually replaced.by Karel Kouba as the 
leading spokesman ~ for the gradualist approach. Kouba's measures for privatization included 
the liberalization of all internal prices and the slow liberalization of foreign.trade and 
commercialization of state enterprises. These were to be followed by privatization where 
appropriate. 
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According to Myant, Milos Zeman, who would later become prime minister in the 
late 90s, helped bridge the gap of the two ideas. In the end, privatization emerged as a 
mixture of the following four concepts: direct sale into Czech ownership, mostly in thee form 
of auctions; two. waves of vouchers; partial sale to foreign companies; and the restructure of 
state ownership with gradual privatization later. What seemed on the surface to be an 
inclusion of certain Socialist market mechanisms into a modern market economy. however 
fell, far short of the economic and political systems envisioned by the economic reformers of 
. the Dubcek era and the dissidents of the Havel era. The beginning of this dramatic shift 
began with voucher privatization. 
Klaus was the originator or the voucher method. Vouchers were sold in Kc 1000 
blocs (each worth 1000 points) to any one who wished over the age of 18. Only one could be 
purchased but owners could turn around to buy and sell to one another. They could also be 
sold to investment fund groups, ~ such as Harvard Funds, which promised huge returns. Klaus 
claimed that the voucher method was the most equitable way to redistribute state property 
into private hands. Indeed, ~it was ~ nearly ingenious in its premise in that citizens would truly 
(at least at first) feel as if they were given a fair opportunity to re-appropriations. However, 
it can easily be seen that Klaus never felt this would truly get the state industries and property 
back to "the people", as he once quipped that the voucher method would "take the Socialist 
apologists at their word. (Klaus xiii)". Klaus knew that these coupons would quickly change 
hands through lucrative sales to investment companies and end up in the possession of an 
elite few exactly what capitalism needed! Arguments against the vouchers included 
inflation; the thought was that the public would sell the shares at once (like Klaus predicted) 
but that the outcome would be an immediate spending spree, forcing. prices to skyrocket. 
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Another challenge to the voucher method was that perhaps the coupons would not get 
sold and ownership of companies would be too widely dispersed for the shareholders to take 
an active interest in the company. The third point of opposition was simply that the voucher 
method was untested, and that ~ consequently foreign trading links would take a long `wait and 
see' attitude before they chose to invest in Czech companies. 
One of Klaus's explanations for Voucher privatization was that it speeded up an 
otherwise agonizing process caused by the lack of real owners. Vouchers would privatize the 
Czech Republic almost overnight and relatively speaking they did work just that quickly. 
Klaus boasts in an essay entitled Privatization .~xpe~ience: The Czech Case: "Privatization 
by voucher turned more than 7~ percent of Czech adults into shareholders. Each of them 
now [1993] owns shares in either some of the 1,500 privatized companies or in some of the 
,investment privatization funds (Klaus 73)". This was nice for the time being, but Klaus as 
well as a number of economists in the ODS, knew that the lack of legislation protecting 
minority shareholders, which they had consciously sought to delay, would eventually bring 
these stocks to the hands of concentrated ownership (Myant 117). And if the shareholders 
did not come around to the idea of making a quick profit (which many of them did) then 
perhaps they would be forced to sell. 
Supposedly, Voucher privatization was based on property rights; however, it is clear 
that property rights ~ are exactly what Klaus did not want. In fact, Klaus seems to argue that 
well-defined property rights stifle prosperity. Again, one could ask, "The prosperity for 
whom?", but it is clear that anon-understanding, or an unclear understanding of who should 
own what is what Klaus had intended. As Klaus explains in reference to his beliefs in Adam 
Smith; "[Smith] knew well that the wealth of a nation grows only when individuals get 
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richer," and that this will only happen if the economy is "liberalize[d], deregulate[d], and 
privatized] at a very early stage of reform (Havel 82)", even if this means doing it before 
sufficient legislation is in place. Economic and legal "Blueprints", or attempts to 
"mastermind the whole process" before privatization would only lead the country to "falling 
into the reform trap (Klaus 83)". Hence, for Klaus, if there is a loosely defined system of 
property rights. then it becomes possible to accumulate property (yes, even if unjustly) 
without anyone knowing whether it.has been done through legal transactions or not. 
Again, Klaus ties economic rights to a general philosophy of human wants, needs, 
and basic rights. The loosely defined system of property rights becomes the "basis for the 
rationality of behavior of economic agents and therefore, the basis for affluence and 
prosperity (Klaus 69)". Property for Klaus was something that was inherently a rightful 
possession of the people. He describes the transformation process as a "process by which the 
`no owner' or quasi-owner, the government, transfers the `non assets' to their initial 
owners ... (Klaus 71)"; however, it seems apparent that Klaus defines "the people" as majority 
shareholders. Certainly~voucher privatization initially gave the mass population property 
rights, and in a fair and just manner, but what initially happened was not as important as what 
would eventually happen. As Klaus explains, "the goal of transformation privatization was 
not to complete the restructuring of property rights, but on the contrary, to be its beginning 
(Klaus 56)". The process of transformation then begins at its very outset with no rules for 
property rights. "The task of government", he continues, "at that moment was to find the 
first private owners, not the final ones (Klaus 56)". Here it seems Klaus is alluding to what 
he predicted would be -the final outcome. Government couldn't decide, nor could it regulate 
property rights; its only purpose would be to offer the property at a minimum price and allow 
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individual actors to decide who would end up with what. Klaus doesn't say it explicitly, but 
it doesn't take an economist to understand that most of this property would .eventually be in 
the hands of those who had connections to political or economic power incidentally, Klaus 
had ties to both: 
Speed was necessary in order for Klaus' transformation process to work properly. 
Measures needed to betaken during the initial chaos of transformation before pressure 
groups could successfully block them (Klaus 20). According to Klaus, "the very fashionable 
and sophisticated debate about optimal sequencing of reform measures and about shock 
therapy versus gradualism is simply missing the point (Klaus 83)". It is simply missing the 
point because according to Klaus, capital needs to be quickly accumulated into the hands of a 
few who can direct the economy most efficiently. For Klaus, majority shares of capital in the 
hands of many can only lead to indecision and inefficiency. Furthermore, as he states in his 
7th Commandment of System Reform, monopolizing functions must be allowed initially for 
the economy to reach optimum efficiency (Klaus 47). 
The mass transformation of property into private hands, in the most efficient manner, 
is a prime example of how the political ideologies took~a dramatic shift from those of the 
former Socialists. To help foster these new ideas, Czechoslovakia was straddled with a 
weak, if not corrupt, legal framework. Key factors were, lack of controls over share dealing, 
l~.ck of protection for minority shareholders, few rules governing the administration of the 
IPF's, and overall, the laws that were in place were usually not enforced (Myant 138). There 
were, as Myant points out, a preponderance of powerful entrepreneurs and politicians 
favoring a weak legal system. 
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- Tomas Jezek, head of the FMVI (national property fund) was a master at exploiting - 
.the lax legal regime, and was not shy about praising it (at Ieast during the early 90's). "The 
application - of normal laws to the privatization process is impermissible," he claimed, "we 
have privatization so -that, after its completion, normal laws can apply (Myant -129)". 
Essentially, Jezek believed that such a system was not only favorable, but necessary to the 
quick recovery.. and implementation of a permanent and just .system of private property. - 
Ironically, Jezek was not only head of a maj or property fund, but a boyhood friend of Klaus 
and the first minister of privatization when the voucher method was established (Klaus xii). 
It is not surprising then that Klaus similarly claimed a distrust of legal influences during 
privatization. In a student seminar at the Fraser Institute in 2004 he stated, "good legislation, 
good institutions, and good rules are necessary,- but it is impossible to make the markets 
efficient ~by means of legislation and to solve economic problems by legislating them out 
.(Notes fog F~aseY from Klaus)".-
Klaus explains the transformation as an opportunity to "get rid of the irrationalities 
and injustices of the flld:..regime (Klaus 7)". For Klaus the irrationalities and injustices 
come from the same ideology Socialism and effect equally for similar reasons both social 
and economic injustices. In fact, in the case of the Czechs at the very least, for Klaus, one 
injustice was the other and vice a versa; according ~o Klaus social injustices (i.e. regulated 
markets) did not allow citizens to fulfill economic freedoms which are not only necessary but 
vital characteristics of sovereignty. - Similarly, economic freedom allows proper and 
necessary social freedoms. For Klaus, freedom includes economic freedom in the neo-liberal 
sense of the term. There is no freedom or sovereignty with government intervention in 
markets. 
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. Although the sources of influence for the transformation of the Czech economy may 
very from source to source, Klaus seems to know exactly where the source lies: Adam Smith. 
Czechs today may argue their ideologies have not changed since 1968, but it is quite certain 
that no one in the Socialist and dissident movements before 1989 was espousing the 
philosophy of Adam Smith or Hayek or Milton, or other sources of inspiration for Klaus. In 
fact, Klaus addressed the National Association of Business Economists in 1992 on Smith, 
whose "thinking...has guided Czechoslovakia's economic transition (Klaus 81)". Thin 
particular address offers an in-depth look into Klaus' own philosophical beliefs that drove his 
economic reform strategies, allowing Czechs the freedom to decide what they want to do 
with what, when they want (Klaus S) . 
From the speech, it is quite clear that Klaus believes that an economic system is more 
than just a means to a hopeful prosperity; it is (in its most proper form) a reflection of 
"human wants and desires (Klaus 81)". Essentially, Laissez-faire, market economy, devoid of 
any .Socialist market mechanism, represents human liberty, freedom of choice, and most 
importantly is not centrally administered. However, a liberal market economy has more than 
the previously mentioned purposes; it is also the "best and only available way to maximize 
the welfare of ~a11 members of .society (Klaus 82)". Obviously this is quite a different way to 
maximize the welfare of all members of society than the evenly distributed production and 
the "fair deal" of Socialism that Dubcek had believed in and wrote about in his biography. 
Similar to Havel, Klaus speaks of the economy and government in general and its 
conduciveness to human nature. "Violation of human nature," Klaus claims "as a byproduct 
of collectivist ambitions resulted in an Orwellian totalitarian system, and we are happy it is 
over. Violation of human nature ~to fulfill moralist, elitist, and perfectionist ambitions would 
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result ~ in a Huxleyan Brave New World, which would lead us ~to nevv complications (Klaus 
5}". This seems to be the central point of Klaus's philosophy; that collectivist ambitions 
resulted in violations of human nature as it attempted to fulfill moralist, elitist, and 
perfectionist ambitions, meaning that the Socialists believed they knew what was wrong with 
society and how to better it. They not only wanted to transform institutions and rules but 
people as well. Conversely, Klaus's economic ideology is of liberal, passive and. 
deregulatory systems in which .free societies are able to decide for themselves what to do 
with what. Unlike Havel however, who feels the economy is only one element of freedom, 
Klaus believes the pure Capitalist economy is the central component to human sovereignty. 
Without an unregulated .economy, man simply is not free! 
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Klaus _and the strategic implementation of Capitalism 
A roblem that both Havel and Klaus can agree on~ is the failure to decentralize the p 
monopoly of power and. information post 1989. However, both have different theories as to 
why the political and economic system never became decentralized. Havel would have you
believe that there existed a monopoly of power and information within the former corrupted 
Communist officials. Klaus on the other hand, would have you believe that the ..intellectual 
elites (Vaclav Havel being one on his list) have been able to remain within the new 
government enough so that their influence to become philosopher kings to preach morality to 
society has won out and that the current system (2006) is nearly identical to the Socialist state 
(Notes foY F~ase~ Institute, .Klaus 2). 
Martin Myant as well as Lawrence King discuss in great length the issue of 
monopolies of power and information and will assert (more in agreement with Havel) that 
although the Prague Spring and the Velvet Revolution were considered popular movements 
of the people, the monopoly of political power, information and assets were never. 
decentralized which led to corruption as well as stagnation of the political transformation. 
These valuable commodities, they will claim, stayed in the hands of a few in "Long-
established networks," where "ways of doing things had become habituated (King 3)", 
entrenched in a corrupt political and legal system. 
King refers to Jadwiga Staniszkis, author of The Dynamics of B~eakth~ough, in 
explaining the "top down" method of the transfer of private property and assets. Essentially, 
Staniszkis believes that political power held during the Communist period "became a primary 
asset used by the namenclatu~a to turn itself into a grand bourgeoisie (King 4)". King then 
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cites five conditions that produced these extreme inequalities ~of ownership though .a 
.monopoly of information: one, linking firms to engage in productive activity. and share risk; 
two, obtaining allocations of value goods; .three, the ability to manipulate institutional 
ownership to protect the control exercised by firm insiders; four, teaming up with outside 
owners; and five, capturing state power -for advantage of the firm or firm insiders: The result 
of these conditions has been the personal accumulation of wealth by the insider, the transfer 
of part or the entire old state firm into a new private enterprise and the creation of completely 
new private firms (King ~7). To elaborate, this could mean that the executives. of a company 
may maneuver themselves into a position in which the sale of the state owned firm is bought 
out by a foreign company under the condition that they will remain in management positions. 
This is often referred to as "comprador intelligentsia", which basically means to "...assist[] 
.foreigners in gaining economic control and dominance of one's own society (King 18)". 
Many of these people in positions that claimed a monopoly on information, resources 
and political power, were in a position to make ~a great deal of money the initial financial 
boom made many a millionaire virtually overnight. The power structures .did not really see a 
turnover in high positions ~ the Communists simply turned their hats backward and became 
Capitalists. This in part was helped by a judicial system that was literally in a shambles at 
this point in time. Laws against corruption, embezzlement, bankruptcy and general business 
practices were short in coming, rarely observed and punishments generally. consisted of a 
mere slap on the wrist. Ironically, this environment is what Klaus, Jezek, and other 
businessmen/entrepreneurs, needed to bring private property into the hands of a few so it 
could be run most efficiently and create great amounts of wealth; furthermore, as Klaus 
claimed in a speech given at the Fraser Institute Student Seminar in 2004, this could only be 
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accomplished through~the elimination of unnecessary controls and prohibitions of all kinds 
(Notes fog F~ase~, Klaus). Of course, Klaus doesn't come out and say that stealing, 
embezzlement, etc., are acceptable, but he certainly insinuates that laws regulating such 
crimes take time to develop and that it is better in the long term for privatization to begin 
early without laws than to begin privatization later with laws (Economic T~ansfo~mation, 
Klaus). Ironically, Klaus eventually stepped down in 1997 as chairman of the ODS from a 
financial scandal that included, among a number of other things, "rumors of foreign donations 
to the party and accusations that donations to the ODS had influenced, political decisions 
surrounding the privatization of certain enterprises (Stroehlein). 
It was a time that could be compared to what Adam Smith (whose thinking Klaus 
believes "has guided Czechoslovakia's transformation (Klaus 81)'~', described as the natural 
state; a time before laws and government in which property was divided up by those that 
could make it useful and productive. This utilized what Weber referred to as the "dull whip 
of hunger", the process that allows "the separation of the direct producers from their means 
of production and means of subsistence". A process King agrees with wholeheartedly, 
claiming that the initial rise of capitalism in Western Europe is strikingly similar, if not 
identical to the "creation of post communist capitalism (King 16)". 
Havel seems to concur, claiming that even though the people became empowered 
through a newly elected democratic state, those with the real power remained in the same 
positions as they had pre-1989. Furthermore, those that had a monopoly of information, 
economic resources and political connections (the "once-feared Communist") simply became 
"unscrupulous capitalists (Havel 3)". . It is a quite logical turn of events that those that were 
in positions of power before the revolution.would, more often than not, remain in those 
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positions after the revolution; one. could hardly imagine a government completely cleaned o~f 
its former inhabitants in lieu of a new allotment of unseasoned, untrained average citizens 
turned politicians. Furthermore, it would be nearly impossible to sort out the managers of 
companies, etc., ,that rose to~ their positions simply because ~of their standings in the party and 
those that simply j oined the party so .they could elect their career of choice with greater 
freedom. . The result was that the monopoly of information, economic .resources and power, 
remained in the same hands as before the transition including those that willfully imposed 
"morally ambiguous human tendencies...to serve the daily operation of the totalitarian 
system (Havel 1)". Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that the corruption that once 
existed would not simply transform into another type of corruption. 
Klaus however, sees the non-decentralization of power differently. For Klaus, former 
_Communists reformers and Socialist utopians, entrenched themselves: into the centralized 
power structures to maintain the former centralization and strengthen their Socialist political 
goals. The main culprits for Klaus were the intellectuals, quoting Hayek as the 
"'professional second-hand dealers in ideas', who are proud of not `possessing special 
knowledge of anything in particular',, who do not take `direct responsibility for practical 
affairs' and who need not `even be particularly intelligent' to perform their `mission' (The 
Intellectuals, Klaus 1)". Ironically, these intellectuals' goals Klaus speaks of ~, are similar to 
what Capitalists Like Klaus seemed to see in unregulated markets and weak. judicial systems;
"prefer[ing] ideas, which give them j obs and income and which enhance their power and 
prestige (The Intellectuals, Klaus 1)". According to Klaus, the reason these intellectuals 
formed a resurgence after the fall of Communism is that they found the sometimes unfair free 
markets no longer needed their services. . 
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What is interesting is that both Dubcek and Havel, considered by Klaus as . 
intellectuals, were very opposed to the leveling of society, and felt that proper remuneration 
for work for those with special skills should be sought after. In fact, reviewing Dubcek and 
Havel's approaches to remuneration and the un-leveling of society, it would seem like Klaus 
would somewhat agree. But for Klaus, these intellectuals, the Communist reformers and 
Socialist Utopians, were only thinking of themselves, scorned by the fact that "the free 
market system does not typically reward those who are in their eyes the most 
meritorious". For Klaus, they are "suspicious of free markets" because they "prefer being 
publicly funded (The Intellectuals, Klaus 3)". 
~In fact, for Klaus, the Czech state is far from being the pure economy that he would 
like to see. He believes that these intellectuals are often disguised as environmentalists, 
radical humanists, believers in civil society or communitarianism, multiculturalism, 
feminism, apolitical technocratism, internationalism and NGOism, and all of them "represent 
substitute ideologies for Socialism (The Intellectuals, Klaus 3)". Klaus's rejection of 
Socialist markets is not only understandable, but common. However, comparing feminism to 
Socialism maybe stretching it a bit for even the staunchest believers in Capitalism. Most 
likely Dubcek (while he was living of course), Havel and Klaus would all agree that social 
engineering is rooted in elitist attempts to place the moral values of a few on the entire 
society, but Klaus certainly takes this to an extreme, ultimately feeling that intellectuals such 
as Havel "want to impose their values on others and are convinced that they know better than 
the rest of us what. we need, what we want, and what is good for us. They want to protect us 
from ourselves (P~obleYns, Klaus 2)". The difference seems to lie within Dubcek .and 
Havel's emphasis on social, professional and political freedoms, with a free Socialist market 
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being a part of that freedom, while with Klaus freedom itself begins with a purely free 
.market economy and there is no freedom with excessive economic government regulation 
(The European Union, Klaus 5). 
After Jezek left the Ministry of Finance in 1992, Josef Skalicky initiated a series of 
laws to the Commercial Code conducive to Klaus' wishes that eliminated "restrictive barriers 
to the ownership influence of investment funds (Myant~ 137)". These .would later be referred 
to as "squeeze out" laws. Essentially, corporate squeeze outs allow majority shareholders to 
buyout minority .shareholders without the minority shareholders' consent. An article by Jan 
Vild in Czech Business Weekly claims that the positive effects from minority squeeze outs 
can be seen in the Pareto-efficiency. The Pareto-efficiency simply states that In a situation 
where no shareholder can be better off without someone becoming worse off, actions should 
be taken to allow awin/win situation. Here, it is argued by Vild that allowing majority 
shareholders to buy out~minority shareholders, increases overall national GDP, thereby 
benefiting the public as a whole. According to Vi1d, majority shareholders are then able to 
become more efficient because .they are not bogged down with "burdensome rules designed 
to protect the minority (Vild)". 
The law firm Weil, Gotshal & Manges, conducting a study in January of 2001 for the . 
International Centre for Commercial Law, disagreed, claiming that "Corporate governance in 
,the Czech Republic labours under the system-wide problem of the absence of minority 
shareholder involvement in the affairs of certain large privatized Czech companies, which is 
a result of the method of voucher privatization that occurred in the country (Weil)". The 
study concluded that the Czech Republic should adopt laws protecting ,minority shareholders 
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that are "... in accordance with EU directives (Wei1)", as it ~is currently the. only EU country 
to not do so. 
In the mid 1990s, after a year sabbatical in the U.S. however, Jezek redeemed himself 
by ,passing stricter trading and finance Laws diametrically opposed to those he took advantage 
of only a few years prior. Even so, Jezek continued to defend himself claiming, "non-
standard origins of the capital market had justified non-standard legislation (Myant 137)", 
meaning that a transformation of this type necessitated ~an absent legal system in order for the 
assets to be put into the most productive hands in the shortest amount ~of time. 
In 1995, Jezek, continuing his reparation of a faulty legal system, was able to usher in 
new laws similar to the. EU countries that protected minority shareholders. However, in 
2002, Klaus who had not held a political position within the Czech government since he 
.stepped down as Prime Minister in 1998 was elected president. In 2005, with the help of 
Klaus, the .Chamber of Deputies passed an amended version of the Commercial Code that 
would allow majority shareholders "....the right to buy out securities from minority 
shareholders" once again (Have1 and Holasek 1)". Another problem that faced minority 
shareholders after the new amendments in 2005, aside .from being forced to sell their shares, 
was that they were riot able to set the price of what they were ~ selling. Capital market expert 
Roman Minarik explained that, "The problem here is that there is no definition of adequate 
price and expert appraisals may differ by hundreds of percent," (Minarik). However, this 
~r 
seems to fit perfectly to what Klaus considers true sovereignty, and in direct. contradiction to 
Dubcek's belief in "evenly distributed production and a fair deal (Dubcek 5 8)". As he claims 
in a speech given at Brunel University in 2004, "I believe in free markets, not in fair markets, 
not in regulated markets ... (Klaus 2)". 
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Essentially the squeeze out provision snakes the altruistic purposes of the voucher 
.system null and void. According to Klaus, the voucher system was set up to .allow all 
citizens in the Czech Republic a chance to be owners, an idea remotely in line with the .idea 
of cooperatives. With the help of Jezek and his amendments to ensure more equitability for 
minority and majority shareholders alike, the voucher system at least partly held up to this 
idea. The new amendments to the Commercial Code, however simply took any last 
remaining integrity left in the program. If Klaus truly intended ownership for all Czechs, 
why would he introduce voucher privatization to the general public but .then not protect their 
rights to keep hold of the shares they purchased? Ian Willoughby of Radio Praha was also 
puzzled by the new law, claiming that, ironically the man who signed the amendments to the 
Commercial Code into law to do away with small shareholders "is the, reason why the Czech 
.Republic has such a large number of small shareholders in the first place (Willoughby)". 
One is prone to assumed that an .eventual squeeze out is what Klaus had intended all along. 
Following the passage of the newly amended code, minority shareholders began to go 
down by the dozen. In the weeks following the new code, news sites seemingly could hardly 
keep up with all the companies that were acquiring the shares formerly purchased by them 
under the assumption that they were getting a piece of their country back. In one buyout 
alone, SABMiller, bought out the shares of 56,000 minority shareholders' stock in Plzensky 
Prazdroj, a major Czech brewery (Minarik). There are countless others; too many and too 
redundant to mention. 
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Conclusion 
Obviously there are countless theories about the transition to democracy in the Czech: 
Republic and although it maybe argued that essentially the main stream philosophies have 
roughly remained the same, it is quite obvious in this examination of the three most 
prominent political figures of the last half of the 20th Century in the Czech Republic, that a 
difference clearly lies between main stream ideologies of the. Dubcek, Havel and Klaus eras. 
Most interesting are the subtle transformations that happened with Dubcek and.Havel. 
Obviously, .Dubcek was the most strident hard lined Communist in the classic sense of 
Marxist and Leninist ideologies. Dubcek's .father and brother also were highly involved in 
the Communist parties of Slovakia before the 2nd World War. In fact, it seems as though the 
Dubcek family did .their best to actually live the utopian life that Communism claimed to 
offer, at one time spending almost three years in a cooperative outpost_ fledgling town in the 
far reaches of Eastern Russia. Dubcek's father spent a great deal of time during the 2nd 
World War hiding from the Nazis as he was a well :known Communist .official, while his 
brother was actually killed fighting with a band of Communist supporters against the Nazis in 
the early days of Slovakia's virtual surrender to Germany during the war. 
~. Havel on the other hand is a bit of an enigma; almost impossible to put your finger on 
just exactly what he believes and does not. However, I believe this analysis has provided 
ample evidence that, although he claims to not.have changed his beliefs one bit, it has been 
obvious that certain beliefs concerning the benefits of Socialism most notably his belief in 
cooperative based enterprises he spoke of in The Power of the Powerless) were devoid in any 
later writings post 1989, while a new emphasis in the newly popular free markets becomes a 
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dominate subject with its benef is Qexplained in great detail something never really 
mentioned before ~ 1989. . 
Finally, Klaus exemplifies the final and dramatic shift that virtually killed any last 
remaining hope of the classic form of Socialism with a human face. Obviously, there were 
others like Klaus, pre-1989 that had been planning different forms of market economies; they 
just were not allowed to put them into any kind of practice. In fact, Klaus explains in one of 
his speeches that it was for this .reason that Czechoslovakia was more easily able to make the 
jump to purer forms of free markets than the Poles or the Hungarians. According to Klaus, 
these two countries had not only been working on alternative forms of Socialist free markets, 
but to small but varying degrees were able to put them into practice. Hence, when 
Communism fell, Poland and Hungary had reformed Socialist market mechanisms in place 
that were more difficult to root out. Czechoslovakia on the other hand, had a purely planned 
economy, giving them the opportunity to make a clean break to pure markets. 
What has transpired over the last four decades in Czech mainstream political 
ideologies has culminated iri not apathy for Socialism with a human face, but rather a 
forgetting, akin to the forgetting Czech writer Milan Kundera describes in his novel The 
Book of Laughter and Forgetting. However, in this case, it is not the image of a politician in 
the minds of the people that have been forgotten because it has been erased from a . 
photograph; images of the. Czechoslovak Socialist and dissident movement. are literally. 
everywhere and are deeply imbedded into the minds of Czechs and Slovaks, old and young 
alike. In this case, it has rather been the forgetting of an idea that has been erased by a new 
government with new ideas of its own. 
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Today the people of the Czech Republic seem to care little about whether or not there 
used to be a Socialist movement and aside from reports in the newspapers and Websites,~ there 
seems to~ be Little public outcry concerning minority shareholder rights, and it would seem as 
though thoughts of "Socialism with a human face", are only a blip of naivete in a now distant 
Czech history. In fact, most Czechs today would tell you they have no major concerns with 
the economy or life in the Czech Republic. Like most people in relatively stable countries all 
.over the world where mass poverty doesn't exist within the masses and the government 
generally minds its own business, Czechs today (to steal aquote -from Havel) are simply 
content to "build houses, buy cars, have children, amuse themselves, live their lives", and 
leave politics to the politicians. 
66 
Possible Directions for Future Research 
One difficulty in writing this paper was keeping a strict focus of the ~subj ect at hand. 
Not because the subject matter was uninteresting far from it. Rather, the subject matter 
continually opened itself up to further questions to be considered.. Primarily, the focus 
tended to direct itself to the question of why the transformation had not produced a reformed 
Socialist outcome. Historically, this had been a Socialist and dissident movement aimed at 
bringing an end to an autho~ita~ian government, not ~ a Socialist one: 
One explanation maybe that Socialist ideologies and dissident rn.ovements had little 
to do with the fall of Communism. Rather, the fall was a consequence of the economic and 
political collapse of the Soviet Empire. In analyzing the collapse of the Soviet Empire, Both 
.Amber Vincent and George G. Keenan of the Universities of Philadelphia and Princeton 
respectively, give weight to this theory, explaining that one can speculate as to whether 
political reforms had affected the fall of the Soviet Empire, but ultimately the failure of the 
economy brought the Empire down. 
One would ,have to agree that if the Czech dissident and Socialist movements had 
forced the downfall of the Czech Communist Party, it would make sense that the ideologies 
that accompanied the movements would have been a strong enough force to reform 
Socialism. However, the movements had been going on for years without any real tangible 
results. To think they would suddenly have the power to topple a government would be 
overlooking twenty years of ineffectiveness. Furthermore, these reform Socialists and 
dissidents had generally remained outside the power structures; .therefore, in the wake of the 
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Velvet Revolution, the monopoly of power and information was controlled primarily by, as 
Havel would say, corrupt Communists turned unscrupulous Capitalists: 
Whatever the case may be, I believe a study of these issues may provide .useful 
information on governments in~transition. Furthermore, it could demonstrate the possibility 
that Capitalist forces underlying a transition and those who hold strategic positions with 
monopolies of power and information are a primary effect of the outcome. Beyond this, one 
could look at larger issues such as the effects of global capitalism on non-capitalist 
governments and how such forces affect mainstream political ideologies. Obviously such a 
project would go beyond the situation in the Czech Republic; however, .universalizing it 
would be its greatest benefit, making it applicable for political .scientists as well as 
economists to study transition governments throughout the world. 
Also, a recently a new question has begun to emerge within Czech politics and how 
Czech history is viewed. It begs the question, is the euphoria of the Velvet Revolution over? 
Are Czechs seeing themselves, once again, as somewhat naive to have Left reformed 
Socialism for another Utopian society called Capitalism that promised to make everything 
better? Recent debates over the necessity to celebrate the Prague Spring annually or to run 
nostalgic pre-1989 Communist television shows have perhaps made "Socialism with a face" 
a hot topic once again. Perhaps Klaus is right to fear the creeping in of Socialist Utopians. 
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